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I examine corporate evolution, i.e. how a firm changes its scope through
diversification into new businesses and exits from existing ones and what it learns
from this process.  I analyze the type of scope experience acquired by the firm, and
suggest that the firm’s scope decisions entail two types of learning, product-market
learning and environmental learning, that have distinct effects on the firm’s future
scope choices.  I suggest that by failing to account for environmental differences
and focusing too closely on product-market relatedness, firms may be misled into
presuming that potential new businesses are much closer to their existing
businesses than they truly are.  I use longitudinal data on the Fortune 250 firms to
test these arguments and show that ignoring environmental relatedness may be one
ix
explanation for an unanswered riddle in the strategy literature: why does related
diversification fail?
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11 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Received research suggests that a firm should seek scope changes in a
direction similar to its existing activities.  This way, the firm’s current capabilities
will be related to what is required in the new industry, allowing the firm to enjoy
synergistic benefits from doing both activities as opposed to only doing one of
them.  However, researchers have found that although related diversified firms
outperform unrelated diversified firms on average, related diversification is no
guarantee of a favorable risk/return performance, and many related diversifiers do
badly (Bettis & Mahajan, 1985).  This prompts the natural question: “Why does
related diversification fail?”  I investigate both the entry and exit decisions of firms
over time in search of an answer to this question.  More specifically, in this
dissertation I examine corporate evolution, i.e. how a firm changes its scope
through diversification into new businesses and exits from existing ones and what it
learns from this process.  I ask two questions: (1) How does the firm’s learning
affect the direction of its entry choices?, and, (2) How does the firm’s learning
affect the direction of its exit choices?
To answer these research questions, I analyze the type of scope experience
acquired by the firm, and suggest that the firm’s scope decisions can lead to two
2types of learning; product-market learning and environmental learning.  I argue that
by evaluating a firm’s scope choices in terms of their contribution to these two
types of learning, I can predict the firm’s future scope choices (which businesses a
firm will enter or exit).  I suggest that by failing to account for environmental
differences and focusing too closely on product-market relatedness, firms may be
misled into presuming that potential new businesses are much closer to their
existing businesses than they truly are.
I use longitudinal data on multi-unit firms competing in multiple industries
to test the key aspects of these arguments.  I estimate two equations addressing the
scope decisions of both entry and exit.  The first equation relates the type of scope
experience acquired by the firm, in terms of product-market and environmental
learning, to the firm’s subsequent entry choices, i.e. whether the firm acquires a
given business.  The second equation relates the type of scope experience acquired
by the firm to the firm’s subsequent exit choices.  I measure the dimensions of a
firm’s scope choices, which includes all of its strategic business unit
diversification/entry or divestment/exit activities, longitudinally to accurately
capture the phenomenon of corporate evolution.
I believe that taken together, the findings of this study will provide evidence
that what a firm learns (type of scope experience) does indeed affect the
organization’s performance.  I argue that for diversified firms to succeed, they need
to account for both product-market relatedness and environmental relatedness
3between existing and new businesses.  Firms that enter businesses with related
product-markets but dissimilar environments are more likely to perform poorly
than firms that enter businesses with both related product-markets and
environments.  I theorize and expect to find that firms will be more likely to pursue
product-market and environmental choices that are similar to their previous
product-market and environment experiences.
1.2 Conceptual overview
1.2.1 Theoretical perspectives
I draw upon three literatures to build my arguments.  First, the underlying
approach in this dissertation is based on the resource-based view of the firm.  The
unit of analysis is the firm.  I examine the knowledge building capabilities of firms
and I argue that firms differ in how they develop their knowledge building
capabilities, and include firm-level factors as both independent and control
variables to emphasize the role of firm heterogeneity in my analysis of corporate
evolution.  I argue that a firm’s knowledge building capability is subject to “time
compression diseconomies” (the firm must have the necessary time to develop its
internal capabilities) and it is dynamic, therefore an analysis must take place over
time (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).  I also argue that through such an analysis, it will
become apparent that certain directions of growth as well as decline are more
4appropriate given the firm’s distinctive knowledge building capabilities (Penrose,
1959).  Thus, based on a firm’s knowledge building resources, its corporate
evolution can be predicted with respect to both direction and success.  Accordingly,
the resource-based view of the firm can help us to understand a fundamental
question in strategy; how does a firm develop a unique resource that serves as a
sustainable advantage (Porter, 1980; Barney, 1986).
Second, I build on the organizational learning perspective.  This study joins
the literature’s discussion of knowledge acquisition through an analysis of
organizations learning from their own experience (Huber, 1991).  Accumulating
useful knowledge is one of the key objectives of a firm (Grant, 1996).  Yet, not all
scope choices are equal in this respect.  Different experiences give way to different
types of learning and knowledge.  I argue that a firm’s experiences can develop into
two types of learning, product-market learning and environmental learning, which
contribute to the firm’s knowledge differentially.  Adopting this perspective can
also be helpful in shedding light on a fundamental question: how does
organizational learning influence the future choices and performance of firms?
Third, I build on the evolutionary economics, path dependence and strategic
decision-making literature.  I argue that firms develop organizational practices and
routines that are specialized to specific environments.  When firms expand into new
businesses, such businesses can differ from firms’ existing experiences along two
dimensions.  First, the product-market knowledge required to successfully compete
5in the new business may differ.  Second, the environment of the new business can
be different in terms of its basic characteristics such as munificence, complexity
and dynamism.  For instance, mainframe computers and personal computers may
both require an understanding of the same computing technology and
manufacturing processes.  Thus, the underlying product-market knowledge may be
the same for both businesses.  Yet, the actual competitive environment of these two
industries may be widely different and may demand very distinct organizational
routines, practices, and dominant logics.  Thus, the environmental knowledge
elements may be very different.
Thus, even though firms that have participated in a business may have a
good understanding of the product-market knowledge required for the new
business, without an understanding of the environmental knowledge required to
compete in the new business in terms of routines and practices, an expansion into
such new businesses could be unsuccessful.
1.2.2 Motivation
From the perspective of the organizational learning perspective, “more
effort has gone into identifying knowledge as the basis of competitive advantage
than into explaining how organizations can develop, retain and transfer (their)
knowledge” (Argote & Ingram, 2000, p.156).  To help in this aim, this study
6contributes to the notion of exercising appropriate judgment in a firm’s scope
decisions.  I argue that the direction of the firm’s corporate evolution can be
managed proactively by the firm in order to build up its knowledge base and
develop its learning skills.  There is little work on how firms can conduct their
strategic choices aptly, in order to maximize their firm’s learning experience and
knowledge accumulation.  This study seeks to fulfill this objective.  I also argue
that the literature’s notion of experience, with respect to a firm learning from its
own experience, can be broken down into at least two distinct types (product-
market and environmental experiences), and claim that these different types of
experiences can generate different learning capabilities for the organization.  As a
result, this study helps to fill multiple gaps in the organizational learning literature.
This research also responds to a call for “better theories of learning that will
more gracefully accommodate the effects of history and timing on organizational
events…focus on the mapping process and provide structured insight into how a
sequential stream of experience becomes the basis for action” (Cohen & Sproull,
1991, Editor’s Introduction).  In this dissertation, my analysis of corporate
evolution will take into account the effects of a firm’s history and timing on an
organization’s activities and how this impacts its future organizational actions.  I
examine the firm’s scope decisions where learning is accumulated and argue that a
firm’s scope choices affect its future selections.
7Third, from the evolutionary perspective, the study contributes to the idea
that firms are cumulative repositories of both codified, formal knowledge as well as
tacit, firm-specific learning embodied in the firm’s collective routines (Nelson &
Winter, 1982).  Since every firm is different, each firm edges along its own unique
path into the future, constrained by what it has been capable of doing in the past but
selecting the best alternatives that it can for itself, given the limitations of bounded
rationality (Nelson & Winter, 1982).  Therefore, at any point in time, firms will
display a substantial amount of variation amongst themselves because each is
composed of its own capabilities and decision rules and expertise (Nelson &
Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988).  This dissertation attempts to test the hard to measure
evolutionary constructs of cumulative learning, tacit knowledge, and path-
dependency in multi-unit firms competing in multiple industries.  I investigate the
scope choices of firms, and hope to extend the notion of path-dependency and
improve our understanding of the underlying processes of corporate evolution.
1.2.3 Research design
I test the hypotheses of a firm’s future scope decisions using a longitudinal
data set of multi-unit firms competing in multiple industries.  Longitudinal data
from the study period of 1981 to 1989 allows for the testing of the causal
8arguments as well as the dynamic aspects of the firm’s evolution.  The main
empirical method applied in this study is longitudinal regression analysis.
1.3 Contributions
This dissertation has three main theoretical contributions, as well as
implications for empirical work and practice.  First, this research responds to a call
to address the strategic role of different types of experience.  Ingram and Baum
(1997) suggest that “different types of experience generate different capabilities for
the organization and the arguments about the strategic role of experience cannot
ignore this” (Ingram & Baum, 1997).  In my analysis, I argue that with respect to a
firm learning from its own experience, this notion can be broken down by way of at
least two features (product-market and environmental experiences), and claim that
that these different types of experience can generate different learning capabilities
for the organization.  Thus, I hope to increase our understanding about the strategic
role of experience.
Second, from the perspective of strategy, and specifically the literatures on
corporate diversification and evolution, this study contributes significantly to the
notion of relatedness.  In the diversification literature, one important area of focus
has been the direction of diversification, which investigates the “basis and extent of
relatedness between the new and old lines of activity” (Ramanujam & Varadarajan,
91989).  The theoretical reasoning behind why related diversification should be
beneficial is that the related tasks rely to some degree on shared skills or resources,
allowing the firm to enjoy synergistic benefits from doing both activities as
opposed to only doing one of them.  Various dimensions have been used to
investigate the direction of diversification, including industries, technologies,
products and services, geographic markets, customer segments, and distribution
channels (Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Palepu, 1985; Roberts & Berry, 1985;
Varadarajan, 1986; Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987; Haveman, 1992; Mitchell,
1989).  In this dissertation, I make a distinction between product-market and
environmental relatedness, based on my definition of product-market and
environmental learning.  In doing so, I open up the notion of relatedness by
expanding its dimensions.
Third, my dissertation shows how this new environmental relatedness factor
can explain why even many related diversifiers don’t perform well, as they fail to
account for the environmental dissimilarity in the acquired business.  I introduce
environmental relatedness as an important factor in corporate diversification and
evolution, and one that earlier research has ignored.  I make a case that
environmental learning taps into the concept of the dominant logic of the
organization (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986).  This dissertation hopes to bring new light
onto these important topics of corporate diversification and evolution.
10
From an empirical standpoint, this research contributes to the empirical
testing of many theoretical ideas in the resource-based view, organizational
learning and the evolutionary perspective, and thus responds to the many calls for
more work in this area.
Finally, a better understanding of how firms can conduct their strategic
choices more appropriately, in order to maximize their firm’s learning experience
and knowledge accumulation, has managerial implications.  Top management
teams can evaluate their firm’s learning capabilities more thoroughly and select
their firm’s next strategic choices accordingly.  This strategy will allow the firm to
leverage its prior knowledge and learning and thus, increase its performance in its
strategic choices both now and in the future.
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2 Literature review
In this chapter, I review the core theories and concepts that have been used
in the literature in the context of corporate evolution.  Throughout the section, I
will also review the relevant empirical work and findings applicable to my study.
As I clarified in Chapter One, I am interested in understanding the determinants of
the direction of a firm’s evolution, i.e. the firm’s scope changes including
diversification/entry and divestment/exit.  I first investigate prior literature within
the theoretical traditions of industrial organization economics and the resource-
based view with respect to my question of interest.  Thereafter, I review relevant
aspects regarding the direction of a firm’s evolution within the organizational
learning, evolutionary economics and strategic decision-making perspectives.
2.1 Literature Review on Product-Market Determinants
2.1.1 Industrial Organization Economics
Industrial Organization economics (IO) focuses on the structure of markets,
the conduct of firms, and the performance that results from this, with respect to
both consumers and producers (Scherer & Ross, 1990).  The paradigm of IO most
commonly applied to strategy, the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) approach,
has been used to address issues relevant to this dissertation’s focus.  From this
12
perspective, patterns of corporate entry and exit from a business are likely to be
determined by the “market structure” of the relevant industries (Scherer, 1980;
Shepherd, 1979; Caves, 1987).  More specifically, the various structural
characteristics that affect entry or exit include concentration of sellers and buyers,
product differentiation, barriers to entry, cost structures, demand growth and firm
size.
Firms prefer to compete in highly concentrated markets, in which a handful
of firms have the majority of the market share, because it has been positively linked
to performance (Collins & Preston, 1968; Miller, 1969; Gale, 1972; Dalton & Penn,
1976).  Highly concentrated industries can result from enduring scale economies,
where large producers obtain a lower cost per unit than smaller producers (Scherer,
1980).  Through their heavy volume, large producers can gain significant market
share, and their efficiency in production is rewarded with high performance.
Another explanation for this positive relationship between high concentration and
elevated performance is the market power argument, where according to Shepherd,
“market power is the ability of a market participant or group of participants… to
influence price, quality, and the nature of the product in the marketplace”
(Shepherd, 1970, p.3).  Clearly, the market power argument takes a collusive tone,
where firms use their power to set high prices, leading to higher profits.
Industries characterized by high growth rates are also attractive entry
choices.  If firms find themselves in a situation where the industry they serve has
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stagnant or even declining growth, they can expect that the level of rivalry among
the firms to increase over the shrinking market pie.  In contrast, industries with
high growth rates represent a growing market with increasing opportunities,
potentially less intensive rivalry and where prices can be placed well over costs.
Further enticing entry into high growth industries is the argument that industries
with rapid growth actual favor new entrants because “rapid growth is often
indicative of fundamental shifts in technology or in consumer demand, which
should erode incumbents’ competitive advantages relative to diversified entrants”
(MacDonald, 1985).  In any case, research has shown a positive relationship
between industry growth rates and firm or industry profitability (Gutmann, 1964;
Rhoades, 1973; Bass, et al., 1978; George, 1968).
Though industries that maintain high concentration levels and high growth
rates are attractive candidates for entry, if the lure of high potential returns attracts
too many entrants, incumbent firms’ market share could become eroded and/or
their coordination of prices could become weakened.  Anticipating this situation,
incumbents will try to erect entry barriers to screen out potential entrants.  Entry
barriers can include economies of scale, product differentiation, capital
requirements, switching costs, access to distribution channels, as well as cost
disadvantages independent of scale (Porter, 1980).  Consequently, even though an
industry may display some attractive structural characteristics, it may also retain
others that make entry into it unattractive, such as high entry barriers.  Thus, the
14
SCP approach highlights the importance of firms evaluating multiple structural
characteristics of an industry before selecting it as an entry and exit choice.
A second prediction from the IO/SCP perspective is that firms will seek
scope or skill economies across their activities.  Researchers recognized that a
multi-market firm could enjoy significant cost savings when it would run multiple
product lines within one firm, generating economies of scope (Baumol, Panzar &
Willig, 1982).  Economies of scope or skill occur when a firm can share its inputs
(inputs in the strategy realm are commonly referred to as resources) across its many
businesses (Bailey & Friedlaender, 1982; Panzar & Willig, 1981).  Teece (1982)
has extended the economies of scope and skill argument by introducing rudiments
from transaction costs economics (TCE), and argues that firms will select entry
choices where it can both reapply its inputs and where market failure exists with
respect to these inputs (Teece, 1980; 1982).  These two requirements help to justify
the existence of the multi-business firm since making contractual arrangements
through the market regarding inputs characterized by specificity, tacitness, and
embeddedness can be hampered (Teece, 1980; 1982).  Overall, the economies of
scope and skill observation results in a vital implication for the direction of a firm’s
scope choices.  Accordingly, a firm will choose to diversify in a direction that
enables it to achieve the benefits of scope economies (Teece, 1980; 1982).
15
Empirical research
Empirical work on patterns of corporate entry and exit from a business has
shown that structural characteristics do indeed impact these decisions.  In one of
the first comprehensive diversification studies, Gort (1962) found that diversifying
firms were significantly attracted to high growth industries.  In addition to this
important finding, he also discovered that firms were attracted to industries that
maintained a high rate of technological change (Gort, 1962).  Similarly, in
Lemelin’s (1982) study of firm’s diversification choices, in terms of origin and
target industries, he also finds that high growth industries attract entry.  Lemelin
(1982) also finds that an industry characterized by high concentration seems to act
as a barrier to entry rather than an inducement to entry through high potential
returns.  Work by MacDonald (1985) also confirms the results that high growth
industries attract entry and high industry concentration deters entry.
Turning now to the empirical studies where firms seek scope or skill
economies across their businesses, Teece (1980) investigates petroleum firms and
provides empirical evidence that firms’ diversification choices can be explained by
their similarity in technological resources and skills.  Likewise, the work by
Gorecki (1975) and Lecraw (1984), find that firms will choose to enter industries
where they can transfer and reuse their resources in both advertising and research
and development.  In addition, Lemelin (1982) finds that firms will choose to
diversify into industries that are related to their base industry in terms of “industrial
16
complementarity”, which is a unique way to tap into the similarity between
buyer/seller relationships among industries (Lemelin, 1982).  Just as research and
development and marketing similarities between a firm’s base and target will
attract entry, MacDonald (1985) discovers that exit is more likely to occur in
industries where there is a mismatch in research and development and marketing
orientation.  Altogether, these researchers have argued that their empirical findings
indicate that a firm is composed of certain “specific assets” or skills, and that these
skills will direct a firm’s entry and exit selections in such a way that allows the firm
to obtain scope or skill economies across its businesses (Lemelin, 1982;
MacDonald, 1985; Stewart, Harris & Carleton, 1984).
Conclusion
The IO/SCP perspective indicates that patterns of corporate entry and exit
from businesses are likely to be determined by the market structure of an industry
and in directions where scope or skill economies can be derived from the firm’s
activities.  From my empirical review, I note that researchers have established: (1)
that patterns of corporate entry and exit from businesses are not random, and are
affected by market structure, (2) as well as issues regarding relatedness, and (3) yet,
while the IO/SCP paradigm focuses on both structural characteristics and issues of
scope and skill economies, both of these important issues spotlight the harder
17
“know what” aspects of a business, where the softer “know how” issues are
omitted.
Structural characteristics and scope and skill economies focus on the
concrete, hard facts and “know what” required to successful compete in a selected
business, yet this stops short of investigating the context in which that firm came to
know these things.  For instance, the IO/SCP perspective argues that a firm will
select a business to enter if it knows what it is required to overcome certain entry
barriers and/or if it can share its existing knowledge of advertising in the new
industry.  However, this focus is on the content or “nuts and bolts” knowledge, and
neglects to investigate the context in which that firm came to know these things.  I
argue that the environmental context in which a firm absorbs its knowledge is
equally important to corporate entry and exit decisions, and an investigation into
environmental context represents the forgotten “know how” issue.
2.1.2 The Resource-Based View
The resource-based view (RBV) adopts a more dynamic perspective than
the IO/SCP viewpoint, making it attractive for the examination of corporate
evolution.  The RBV focuses on factors within the firm for answers to firm
behavior, as opposed to the IO/SCP approach that concentrates on industry/market
structure factors for its explanations.  While developing a theory of firm growth,
18
Edith Penrose brought analyses down to the level of the firm, which she referred to
as the “internal world” (Penrose, 1959, p.65).  Penrose asserted that the theoretical
mechanism underlying firm expansion arises from the firm’s administrative unit
trying to decide how best to achieve efficiency benefits from its “pool of unused
productive services, resources, and special knowledge, all of which will always be
found within any firm” (Penrose, 1959, p.66).  She argued that the firm will never
find a resting place, thus it will always be in state of flux from its pool of resources
because it continually presents the firm with three obstacles:
“those arising from the familiar difficulties posed by the
indivisibility of resources; those arising from the fact that
the same resources can be used differently, under different
circumstances, and in particular, in a ‘specialized’ manner;
and those arising because in the ordinary processes of
operation and expansion new productive services are
continually being created” (Penrose, 1959, p.68).
The RBV argues that a firm’s pool of resources will drive the direction of
its expansion choices.  However, researchers within the RBV tradition argue that
not all unused productive resources of a firm should dictate its direction; only those
that can create a distinctive competence and serve as the basis of the firm’s
competitive advantage (Selznick, 1957; Salter & Weinhold, 1979; Porter, 1985,
1987; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991).  The firm should evaluate its stock of
heterogeneous resources and concentrate on developing those that are valuable,
rare, imperfectly imitable, non-substitutable (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989;
Peteraf, 1993).  By targeting its rent generation activities from these superior
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resources, the firm can attempt to create a competitive advantage that will not be
easily competed away by other organizations and earn superior profits (Amit &
Schoemaker, 1993).  These superior resources should also serve as the foundation
upon which the firm builds its interrelationships across its different businesses
(Porter, 1985).  As the firm shares and reinforces its superior resources across its
businesses it creates more opportunities for itself to discover potential synergies,
which results in the firm’s resources accruing even more value as well as
expanding its resource pool through new combinations of resources (Porter,
1985;1987).  The process by which a firm grooms and accumulates its superior
resources and develops its capabilities is subject to “time compression
diseconomies” (meaning, the firm must have the necessary time to develop its
internal capabilities) and it is a dynamic process (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).
The RBV idea of a firm sharing its strategic resources across its businesses
to maximize its opportunities for potential synergies has implications in the context
of corporate evolution.  This insight indicates that relatedness matters and a firm
will pursue its scope decisions based upon whether it can reuse its strategic
resources between its existing and targeted businesses.  Diversification into related
businesses and divestiture out of unrelated businesses allows the firm to focus on
maintaining and reinforcing those strategic resources that can provide it with
potential synergies and a source of competitive advantage.  Thus, the RBV
indicates that relatedness can affect corporate evolution.
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Empirical research
Empirical work on the direction of corporate entry and exit from a business
has shown that the issue of relatedness plays a significant role in these decisions.
The “relatedness” notion within the RBV has a history that can be traced back over
thirty years to the work by Chandler (1962) and Wrigley (1970), though Rumelt
(1974, 1977, 1982) is credited with being the first to empirically test the idea of
relatedness when he linked a firm’s diversification strategy to its performance.
Rumelt’s criteria of relatedness in diversification included whether the firm (1)
functions in similar markets using similar distribution channels, (2) employs similar
production technologies, and (3) used similar scientific research (Rumelt, 1974).
Rumelt’s early work started out with a categorical measure of relatedness, where a
firm is classified into one of several distinctive types of diversification.  Now
however, continuous measures of relatedness are more common in the literature,
which place the firm on a scale that determines its extent of related or unrelated
diversification.  Most continuous measures are derived from the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) system.  The SIC system uses several criteria to categorize
establishments into industries, such as raw materials, production processes, and end
uses of the products.  Though the SIC derived measures represent a notion of
relatedness based primarily on product-markets, researchers have identified that
relatedness can occur along several other dimensions, including technologies,
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activities, and human capital.  I will now review the empirical findings from these
four dimensions.
Empirical work on scope choices and performance has shown that
relatedness based on product-markets impacts these decisions.  Christensen &
Montgomery (1981) built on the work by Rumelt (1974), by updating his study and
examining the effect of market structure, in addition to product-market relatedness,
on the diversification-performance relationship.  The authors find support for
diversification categories and market structure variables, and conclude that the
market structure variables have a moderating effect on the diversification-
performance link (Christensen & Montgomery, 1981).  Rumelt (1982) extends his
own research by also including market structure effects, and continues to find that
the more product-market diversity a firm maintains, the lower its profitability.  He
concludes that his results support the argument that the less product-market
diversity a firm maintains, the more efficiency gains the firm reaps by making the
most of its core factors, idiosyncratic investment, and uncertain imitability (Rumelt,
1982).
In their work on patterns of corporate entry and exit from a business as well
as scope choices and performance, RBV researchers have expanded the notion of
relatedness to include other dimensions such as technology, in addition to product-
markets.  Singh and Montgomery (1987) investigate corporate acquisitions with
shared technological resources and similar product-markets and find that these
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related acquisitions result in superior economic returns than unrelated acquisitions.
Delving into technology services, Robins and Wiersema (1995) investigate the
technology flows among industries and find that firms that have diversified into
technologically related industries have higher corporate performance than firms
that diversified into technologically unrelated industries.  Also focusing on
technology, Silverman (1999) determines that a firm’s technological services direct
its diversification choices to other technologically related industries.  His study is
the first to use a firm’s patent data to determine its technological services.
Besides technology, researchers have looked at other dimensions of
relatedness including a firm’s activities, and its relationship to a firm’s scope
decisions.  Montgomery and Hariharan (1991) tap into a firm’s activities (though
they refer to them as resources), using the advertising and R&D spending patterns
of firms.  The authors find that firms choose to diversify into industries that
maintain similar activity attributes.  Likewise, Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991)
also looked at advertising and R&D intensity, and found that these activities
influenced a firm towards pursuing similar diversification choices as well.  Both of
these studies took into account market structure variables and still found strong
support that firms will choose scope choices where the activities are similar to
those in their existing businesses.
In addition to product markets, technology, and activities, empirical work
on scope decisions has shown that relatedness based on human resources impacts
23
these choices as well.  The impact of human resources on the direction of a firm’s
scope choices was delayed in large part due to the difficulty in obtaining measures
of human resources.  Recently, however, researchers have surmounted the
challenge and identified a source in which to trace a firm’s human resources with,
via the Occupational Employment Survey (OES), furnished by the Department of
Labor Statistics.  By using this source, Farjoun (1994) finds that firms pursue
diversification choices related to their existing human resource profile.  He
examines the firm’s diversification choices using the distinctive concept of
resource-related industry groups, which he developed (Farjoun, 1994).
These different dimensions of relatedness have all tried to tap into the
influence and efficiency gains that come from related choices, with respect to
potential synergies and a firm’s extension of its core factors.  Though researchers
have empirically linked relatedness in terms of product markets, technologies,
activities and human resources to corporate entry and exit as well as to
performance, other empirical results indicate that the relationship may not be so
simple.  Bettis and Mahajan (1985) investigated the risk/return tradeoff in
accounting profits for 80 related and unrelated diversified firms.  In their
examination, they find that although related diversified firms outperform unrelated
diversified firms on average, related diversification was no guarantee of a
favorable risk/return performance (Bettis & Mahajan, 1985).  The authors conclude
from their results that:
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“although related diversification is a necessary condition, it
is not a sufficient condition to achieve a desirable
risk/return performance… managers should not rely on a
related diversification strategy to achieve performance...
much more is needed.” (Bettis & Mahajan, 1985, p.796).
Thus, even though firms may have selected related scope choices and therefore
have the opportunity to tap into potential synergies and share their core factors, the
results by Bettis & Mahajan (1985) point out that our current explanation of the
under workings of relatedness may not be enough and is in some way incomplete.
This indicates that more investigation is necessary to increase our understanding
and discover the true relationship with respect to relatedness; it is my hope that
further investigation will shed more light on this important point and explain why it
is that all related diversifiers do not excel; in fact, some related diversifiers do
poorly (Bettis & Mahajan, 1985).
Conclusion
The RBV approach indicates that focusing on the firm allows us to get closer
to the phenomenon of interest, and that relatedness does matter when a firm is
trying to share its strategic resources across its businesses to maximize its
opportunities for potential synergies and gain a competitive advantage.  From my
empirical review, I note that researchers have established: (1) the view that market
structure is important in determining the direction of diversification and
performance, as argued by the IO/SCP perspective, is reinforced by work in this
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tradition (Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991;
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991); (2) work on the direction of corporate entry and
exit from a business as well as scope choice and performance has shown that the
issue of relatedness plays a significant role in these decisions.  The different
dimensions used to tap into the notion of relatedness has expanded, and now
includes product-markets (Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Rumelt, 1982),
technologies (Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Robins and Wiersema, 1995;
Silverman, 1999), activities (Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991; Chatterjee and
Wernerfelt, 1991), and human capital (Farjoun, 1994); (3) though researchers have
used different dimensions of relatedness to tap into the influence and efficiency
gains that come from related choices and have linked these to corporate entry and
exit as well as performance, other empirical results indicate that the relationship
may not be so clear cut.  Importantly, the RBV doesn’t explain why even among
related diversifiers there is considerable variance in performance; in fact, some
related diversifiers indeed do poorly (Bettis & Mahajan, 1985); (4) finally, even
though research in the RBV tradition has expanded considerably the menu of
considerations to reflect relatedness (e.g. product markets, technology, human
capital, etc.), the focus still remains on essentially content or  “know what” issues.
The context or “know how” aspects have not been examined.
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2.2 Literature Review on Environmental Determinants
2.2.1 Organizational Learning Theory/ Evolutionary Economics Theory
Research in the organizational learning and evolutionary economics
(OL/EE) perspectives has suggested several implications of relevance for this
study.  Some of the core propositions from these streams of research that I shall
build on include: organizational learning is the accumulation of past inferences,
stored in routines; organizational learning is a dynamic process that evolves
gradually, incrementally and in a path-dependent nature; and organizational
learning can negatively impact organizational performance when it is misapplied to
inappropriate situations.  I will now review each of these propositions in turn.
Organizational learning is the accumulation of a firm’s past inferences,
which are stored in its routines, that then structure the firm’s actions (Cyert &
March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Levitt & March, 1988; March & Simon,
1958).  When the firm detects a situation that it believes is repetitive based upon its
former experiences, the firm can act quickly and reliably with a designated pattern
of behavior.  Routines provide a type of “mental short cut” to the firm, by allowing
it to engage in behavior without having to go through full deliberation.  Thus,
routines serve as a special tool to the firm by providing a way for it to efficiently
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structure its knowledge, effectively retrieve it, and avoid potential cognitive
overload.  As Levitt and March explain:
“…organizations are seen as learning by encoding
inferences from history into routines that guide behavior.
The generic term “routines” includes the forms, rules,
procedures, conventions, strategies, and technologies
around which organizations are constructed and through
which they operate.  It also includes the structure of beliefs,
frameworks, paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge
that buttress, elaborate, and contradict the formal routines.
Routines are independent of the individual actors who
execute them and are capable of surviving considerable
turnover in individual actors” (Levitt & March, 1988,
p.517)
Thus, the organization’s routines provide the firm with a useful way to apply its
growing stock of knowledge through actions that are familiar, speedy and reliable.
Similar to the idea of the relationship between a firm’s learning and its
routines, researchers have built on this notion with the concept of the dominant
logic (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986).  A dominant logic is created through “managers’
interpretations of experiences while operating in certain firms and industries”, that
are then translated into a general “mind set or world view or conceptualization of
the business and the administrative tools to accomplish goals and make decisions in
that business…stored in a shared cognitive map (or set of schemas) among the
dominant coalition…expressed as a learned, problem-solving behavior” (Prahalad
& Bettis, 1986, p.489, 491).  The concept of a dominant logic strongly resembles
our discussion above regarding organizational routines; both allow an organization
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to assess a situation and speedily apply a reliable and familiar action plan, thereby
avoiding a potential cognitive backlog.
Organizational learning is a dynamic process that evolves gradually and
incrementally (Lindblom, 1959; Cyert & March, 1963; Allison, 1971; Nelson &
Winter, 1982; Levitt & March, 1988; Teece, 1984; Dosi, 1988).  As a firm gains
new understanding and insights from its direct experiences, it can alter its routines
and beliefs to reflect these (Levitt & March, 1988).  However, this is a gradual
process in that organizational rules and routines are difficult to change and persist
over time (Stinchcombe, 1965; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Cohen & Bacdayan,
1994).  The literature has identified three characteristics of organizational routines
make them hard to redesign: because routines are embodied in multi-actors,
perpetually emergent, and hard to articulate, they are difficult for an organization to
grasp, subsequently making modification challenging (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994).
Nevertheless, the literature has identified two mechanisms that can help to
alter a firm’s routines, include trial and error experiments and organizational search
(Levitt & March, 1988).  The notion of trial and error learning implies that if an
organization’s routine is providing the firm with success in achieving its goals, its
use will be increased; on the flip side, if the routine is not performing in a
satisfactorily way, its use will be decreased (Cyert & March, 1963).1  This learning
response is also confirmed by work in psychology in the behavioral learning
                                                 
1 I recognize that Cyert & March (1963) used the term standard operating procedures in place of
routines.  However, I believe the terms are synonymous here in their intended use.
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theory, which also argues that behavior that is rewarded will persist, while behavior
that is punished will lessen and change (Skinner, 1953; Schwartz, 1978; Haleblian
& Finkelstein, 1999).  If a firm engages in organizational search for potential
alternatives, one would expect the firm to search locally and thereby select choices
in the neighborhood of its current choices, as Nelson & Winter (1982) explain:
“…a firm that is already successful in a given activity is a
particularly good candidate for being successful with new
capacity of the same sort.  The replication assumption in
evolutionary models is intended primarily to reflect the
advantages that favor the going concern attempting to do
more of the same, as contrasted with the difficulties that it
would encounter in doing something else or that others
would encounter in trying to copy its success…in
replicating an existing routine, the firm seeks to impose that
routine’s order on an entire new set of specific inputs.  That
task is a magnified version of one for which it already
possesses routinized arrangements.” (Nelson & Winter,
1982, p.119)
Regardless of which mechanism the firm employs to alter its routines, if the
organization decides that modifications to its routines are necessary, it will
complete them in a way that is gradual.
Organizational learning can negatively impact organizational performance
when it is misapplied to inappropriate situations (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Cohen &
Bacdayan, 1994; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999).  Although the learning curve
perspective predicts positive returns from a firm’s experience, it is based on the
assumption that the opportunity to reapply the firm’s learning and routines is a
suitable one.  In the same way, the behavioral learning theory argues that
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generalization from past experiences to future experiences will lead to positive
outcomes as long as the situations are similar (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999).
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) argue that this notion applies equally well to their
concept of a dominant logic, where the application of a dominant logic can benefit
the firm only if an element of “strategic similarity” exists between its existing
businesses (from which the firm’s dominant logic was formed) and the one the firm
is targeting.  In light of the reality that a dominant logic can be misapplied, the
authors suggests that the similarity/relatedness notion be formally extended by
“develop(ing) a concept of relatedness based on ‘strategic similarities’ of
businesses and the cognitive composition of the top management team…in other
words, relatedness may be as much a cognitive concept as it is an economic and
technical concept (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986, p.499).
Constructive examples of how an organization can misapply its learning
from past experiences, and inappropriately generalize by firing off routines into
completely wrong circumstances is described by Allison (1971), on how the Soviet
Union compromised their performance during the Cuban Missile Crisis:
“…though they had made considerable efforts to disguise
their identity…troops did not wear uniforms but rather
appeared in slacks and sport shirts…(yet, troops) who
arrived in civilian clothes at Cuban docks formed in ranks
of fours and moved out in truck convoys…in an even more
startling signal… Soviet units did decorate the area in front
of their barracks with standard Soviet ground force insignia
representing both infantry and armor forces, elite guard
badges, and even a Red Army Star” (Allison, 1971, p.109).
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Thus, a firm’s learning can allow it to respond to similar situations with speedy and
reliable action.  However, if the firm’s learning is inappropriately applied to a
situation, it can negatively impact the firm’s performance.  Researchers have
concluded, “routines are like a two-edged sword…they allow efficient coordinated
action, but also introduce the risk of highly inappropriate responses” (Cohen &
Bacdayan, 1994, p.405).
Empirical Research
Empirical work on patterns of corporate entry and exit using organizational
learning and evolutionary theory is rare.  Most empirical efforts in this direction
can be found within the IO/SCP or RBV camps, as reviewed in the sections above.
One of the reasons why empirical work using the OL/EE perspectives is scarce is
due to the difficulty in obtaining empirical measures for the constructs.  However,
though very little empirical work on OL/EE exists, the significance of the efforts
that have been made easily make up for the lack of volume.  For instance, the
ground-breaking work by Helfat (1994) provides empirical support for the OL/EE
concepts of cumulative learning and path dependency, as well as the mechanisms
of gradual learning and incremental change.  Investigating the R&D activities of
firms in the petroleum industry, Helfat (1994) creatively devises a way to
empirically tap into many of the hard to grasp constructs of OL/EE.  She finds
support for the ideas that: firm differences do exist; learning is gradual,
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incremental, path-dependent, cumulative and often tacit; and, firms search locally.
She concludes that her results have significant strategic implications in that “these
slow-to-change differential firm capabilities can produce persistent differences in
firms’ performance (Helfat, 1994, p.1745).
More researchers have begun to try to surmount the empirical difficulties
and use the OL/EE perspectives in studies regarding firm scope decisions because
these perspectives allow a dynamic view of the phenomenon.  Attention to this
point was highlighted in a piece by Ramanujam & Varadarajan (1989), where the
authors concluded, after a comprehensive review of the diversification literature,
that there is a great need to “shift the focus of analysis… to cumulative
diversification experiences” (Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989, p.544).
Researchers have responded to their call with studies that employ these theories
and use longitudinal analysis.  For instance, Amburgey & Miner (1992)
investigated strategic momentum and merger activity over a 29-year period
drawing on organizational learning theory’s concepts of routines, competencies,
and accumulated experience.  After examining a firm’s strategic decisions over
time, they conclude that a firm’s experience does matter, and it impacts the firm’s
future actions (Amburgey & Miner, 1992).
Similarly, Pennings, Barkema and Douma (1994) examined the relationship
between organizational learning and corporate diversification using the dissolution
of 462 expansions by Dutch firms.  The authors find support for lateral
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organizational learning, where a firm’s expansions are successful when they are
relatively close to the firm’s current skills.  Results on longitudinal learning, where
the firm gains knowledge just from the magnitude of its expansion activities, were
not as robust as the results on lateral learning but had a strong relationship with
time; thus supporting the proposition that the “accumulation of experiences takes
time” (Pennings, Barkema and Douma; 1994, p.632).  The authors conclude that
their results support both of the organizational learning arguments that firms will
fare better in activities that draw on their previous learning and that “success breeds
success”; where firms that have succeeded before are more likely to replicate their
success in the future due to learning (Pennings, Barkema and Douma, 1994).
Kim & Kogut (1996) investigate the relationship between a firm’s
technological experience and corporate diversification in hyper-competitive
markets.  The authors find support for their idea that a firm’s experience in
“platform” technologies (technologies that have wider technological and market
opportunities) affects both the direction and temporal sequence of their subsequent
entry choices (Kim & Kogut, 1996).  The authors make the unique argument that
just as a core technology follows a technology trajectory, where it evolves and
branches, so too does a firm that has proprietary experience in a platform
technology.  Thus, the authors examine a firm’s capabilities as “platforms”, and
discover that the temporal sequence of a firm’s diversification strategy is
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contingent upon market opportunities as well as the technological history of the
individual firm (Kim & Kogut, 1996).
In the only piece to my knowledge that investigates corporate evolution
comprehensively by examining a firm’s entries and exits over time using the
OL/EE perspectives is a piece by Chang (1996).  In this work, he makes the
argument that firms engage in continuous search and selection through entry and
exit activities in order to improve their knowledge base and performance.  He finds
that a firm’s knowledge base is linked to what businesses an organization will enter
and exit, where the firm’s knowledge base is measured through its human resource
profile.  Thus, this important finding supports the concepts of path-dependency and
that an organization will adjust its actions based on the feedback it receives from its
experiences therefore becoming more focused and directed over time (Chang,
1996).  His paper takes an important first step in using OL/EE to further our
understanding of corporate evolution.
Turning now to empirical studies that investigate whether organizational
learning can negatively impact organizational performance when it is misapplied to
inappropriate situations, Cohen & Bacdayan (1994) have conducted interesting
work in this arena.  Using a laboratory experiment, the authors induce behavioral
patterns from subjects that strongly resemble routines (consequently supporting the
existence of routines) as a way to try and tap into procedural knowledge, as
opposed to declarative knowledge.  The authors find evidence that individuals store
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routines in their procedural memory and that certain manipulations can trigger both
appropriate and inappropriate behaviors.  Their work has important implications for
how we can understand the dynamics of routines, specifically how routines can
arise, trigger behaviors and change.  In addition, the work by Haleblian &
Finkelstein (1999) investigates the relationship between acquisition experience and
acquisition performance and finds a curious U-shaped relationship.  They argue
that their findings suggest that inexperienced acquirers have a tendency to
inappropriately generalize from their acquisition experience to future dissimilar
acquisitions, while more experienced acquirers appropriately discriminate between
their acquisitions.  Altogether, these studies highlight the important lesson that
learning does not always result in positive organizational performance and breathes
new life into the expression “a little knowledge is a dangerous thing.”
Conclusion
The OL/EE perspectives indicate that: (1) organizational learning is the
accumulation of past inferences, stored in routines, (2) organizational learning is a
dynamic process that evolves gradually and incrementally, and (3) organizational
learning can negatively impact organizational performance when it is misapplied to
inappropriate situations.  From my empirical review, I note that researchers have
established: (1) that even though it is not the focus of this line of research,
industry/market structure factors have been included, even as controls, indicating
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that like researchers in the IO/SCP and RBV traditions, OL/EE researchers also
recognize market structure factors as being important (Amburgey & Miner, 1992;
Pennings, Barkema and Douma, 1994; Kim & Kogut, 1996; Chang, 1996;
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999), (2) the view that relatedness/similarity is an
important issue with respect to scope choices is reinforced by work in this tradition,
though it is approached in a different way theoretically as the smooth functioning
of routines, cumulative learning, and path dependency (Helfat, 1994; Amburgey &
Miner, 1992; Pennings, Barkema and Douma, 1994; Kim & Kogut, 1996; Chang,
1996), (3) an organization’s prior experiences and learning affects its future
experiences and learning (Helfat, 1994; Amburgey & Miner, 1992; Pennings,
Barkema and Douma, 1994; Kim & Kogut, 1996; Chang, 1996; Haleblian &
Finkelstein, 1999), (4) a firm can misapply its learning to inappropriate situations
and subsequently hurt its performance (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; Haleblian &
Finkelstein, 1999).  This notion can possibly start to explain why it is that all
related diversifiers do not excel (Bettis & Mahajan, 1985); and, (5) although this
work launches a more dynamic view onto the phenomena of corporate evolution
through learning, the OL/EE perspectives neglect to investigate the context in
which that firm came to know these things.  The strategic decision-making
literature argues that different environmental contexts require different decision-
making processes, which lead to different choices.  Noting that this logic could
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potentially impact corporate evolution, I now turn to the strategic decision-making
literature.
2.2.2 Strategic Decision-Making Perspective
Researchers have concluded that a firm’s ability to use a particular type of
strategic decision-making process depends heavily on the context, of which the
environment is a critical factor (Carter, 1971; Anderson & Paine, 1975; Nutt, 1976;
Bourgeois, 1980; Miller & Friesen, 1983; Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson &
Mitchell, 1984; Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989; Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988;
Eisenhardt, 1989; Priem, Rasheed, & Kotulic, 1995).  The environment can
confront organizations with varying dimension levels of munificence, dynamism,
and complexity, affecting their ability to conduct a particular strategic decision-
making process (Thompson, 1967; Anderson & Paine, 1975; Nutt, 1976; Miller &
Friesen, 1983; Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Fredrickson &
Iaquinto, 1989; Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; Priem, Rasheed,
& Kotulic, 1995).  These three environmental dimensions are not the only ones that
have been linked to strategic decision-making processes, however they embody the
dimensions that are the most widely identified and used in the literature (Emery &
Trist, 1965; Terreberry, 1968; Dill, 1958; Duncan, 1972; Tosi, Aldag, & Storey,
1973; Jurkovich, 1974; Tung, 1979; Dess & Beard, 1984).  Failure to consider
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variations in the environment across these dimensions may lead to poor decision-
making effectiveness (Dean & Sharfman, 1996) or subsequent performance (Miller
& Friesen, 1983; Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Fredrickson &
Iaquinto, 1989; Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; Priem, Rasheed,
& Kotulic, 1995).
Different environments pose different cognitive challenges on a firm,
causing the organization to employ different decision-making processes, which
lead to different choices.  Strategic decision-making is a complicated process,
characterized by intense complexity, ambiguity and lack of structure (Schwenk,
1984).  Decision-makers can easily become overwhelmed by the bombardment of
information to consider, for they “cannot simultaneously consider or process all the
variables and data involved in a decision as complex as acquisition or divestment”
(Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985, p.287).  The mental roadblock that the decision-
makers hit is referred to as bounded rationality in the literature.  Bounded
rationality recognizes that there are cognitive limitations on the decision-makers,
making them unable to handle all of the available, potentially ambiguous
information (Simon,1955, 1976; Cyert & March, 1963).
In an effort to try and reduce the uncertainty and information overload,
decision-makers will use simplification processes, heuristics or mental models to
complete their cognitive tasks (Simon, 1955, 1976; March & Simon, 1958; Cyert &
March, 1963; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982).  Though simplification processes can help
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decision makers manage their cognitive undertaking, these processes can also
introduce bias.  Tversky & Kahneman explain, “in general, these heuristics are
quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors” (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974, p.1124).  Researchers have hypothesized about the potential
cognitive biases that may arise from acquisition and divestment decisions; they
have included reasoning by analogy, illusion of control, escalating commitment,
and single outcome calculation (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985).
The literature identifies several strategic decision-making processes, but a
select two have received the most attention (Mintzberg, 1978; Fredrickson, 1984;
Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Fredrickson &
Iaquinto, 1989; Priem, Rasheed, & Kotulic, 1995).  The synoptic process
(Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; Hofer & Schendel, 1978) and the incremental
process (Lindblom, 1959, 1979; Cyert & March, 1963; Mintzberg, 1973; Quinn,
1978, 1980) have dominated the strategic decision-making literature.  The two
processes represent opposite ends on a continuum, where the synoptic process is
highly rational and comprehensive in that decision-makers: list out all objectives,
values, criteria to fulfill these objectives, and potential alternatives; conduct
complete comparisons; and make strong use of theory in selecting their final choice
(Lindblom, 1959).  In contrast, the incremental process is one where decision-
makers: set out a primary objective and a few other goals; record some alternatives;
compare the choices, but without an emphasis on theory; look at past records of
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their incremental steps; and achieve partial goals, while repeating these steps over
time (Lindblom, 1959).  These two strategic decision-making processes make it
easy to see how different processes can lead decision-makers to select different
choices.
Empirical research
Fredrickson pioneered empirical investigations linking a firm’s environment
to the rationality of its strategic decision-making process and performance
(Fredrickson, 1984, Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989).
Fredrickson reasoned that a firm will chose to act rationally, and this subsequently
indicates that the organization will chose a synoptic decision-making process.
However, certain environments introduce high levels of uncertainty, threatening the
firm’s ability to act rationally and comprehensively.  Fredrickson defines
comprehensiveness as the “the extent to which an organization attempts to be
exhaustive or inclusive in making and integrating strategic decisions” (Fredrickson
& Mitchell, 1984, p.402).  In his path breaking work, he finds that the
comprehensiveness of a strategic decision-making process is negatively related to
the firm’s performance in an unstable industry (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984) and
positively related to the firm’s performance in a stable industry (Fredrickson,
1984).  In a follow-up study five years later, he reinforces his original results
longitudinally (Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989).
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In the opposite direction, a theoretical and empirical case has been made
that in high-velocity environments, comprehensiveness in decision-making
processes will result in positive firm performance (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Eisenhardt
presents a complex perspective on cognition, and argues that in dynamic
environments decision-makers “kick up” their mental abilities and speed along
through processing more information, alternatives, and comparisons through
advice-seeking (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Similarly, Glick, Miller & Huber (1993) also
find that comprehensiveness in the strategic decision-making process positively
related to performance in firms in dynamic environments.
Though these two sets of studies show contradictory results, together they
clearly indicate that different environments cause organizations to employ different
strategic decision-making processes, which lead to different performance outcomes.
Extending this important line of research, Dean & Sharfman (1996) achieve an
excellent empirical contribution with their work linking strategic decision-making,
environment and decision effectiveness (instead of firm performance).  Their
results indicate that decision-making processes and environment are undeniably
related to decision success.
Conclusion
The strategic decision-making literature indicates that: (1) researchers have
also concluded that a firm’s inclination to successfully use a particular type of
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strategic decision-making process depends heavily on the context, of which the
environment is a critical factor (Carter, 1971; Anderson & Paine, 1975; Nutt, 1976;
Bourgeois, 1980; Miller & Friesen, 1983; Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson &
Mitchell, 1984; Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989; Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988;
Eisenhardt, 1989; Priem, Rasheed, & Kotulic, 1995); (2) strategic decision-making
is a complicated process, characterized by intense complexity, ambiguity and lack
of structure (Schwenk, 1984); and, (3) in an effort to try and reduce the uncertainty
and information overload, decision makers will use simplification processes,
heuristics or mental models to complete their cognitive tasks (Simon, 1955, 1976;
March & Simon, 1958; Cyert & March, 1963; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982).  From my
empirical review, I note that researchers have established: (1) that different
environments pose different cognitive challenges on a firm, causing the
organization to employ different decision-making processes, triggering different
heuristics and mental maps, which lead to different choices and performance
outcomes (Fredrickson, 1984, Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Fredrickson &
Iaquinto, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989; Glick, Miller & Huber, 1993; Dean & Sharfman,
1996.
From this literature review, I conclude that a potential scope choice may be
related in a product-market sense (content) to a firm’s existing businesses, yet it
may nevertheless have very different environmental dimensions (context).  Thus, it
is important to consider the characteristics of the industry environment and not just
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product-market matters in entry and exit decisions.  Yet, prior research has not
examined this at all.  I intend to address this significant gap and provide new and
important insights to our understanding of corporate evolution.
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3 Hypotheses
This section presents the main hypotheses of the study.  I contend that the
literature’s notion of experience, with respect to a firm learning from its own
experience, can be broken down into two concepts (product-market and
environmental experiences), and claim that these different types of experiences can
generate different learning capabilities for the organization.  In developing the
hypotheses, I build upon the resource-based view, organizational learning,
evolutionary economics, and strategic decision-making literatures.
For clarity, the following definitions are used.  First, I distinguish between
two types of organizational experiences (product-market and environmental
experiences), which lead to two types of learning: product-market learning and
environmental learning.  I suggest that product-market learning is the accumulation
of the concrete “know what” and hard facts derived from a firm’s experiences in a
given set of product-markets.  This idea of acquiring the substantive knowledge of
a business can be extended beyond product-markets (where I focus), and can
include the “content” learning gained from a firm’s experiences in terms of
technologies, distribution channels, scientific research and production processes.
For instance, knowledge of the semi-conductor technologies used in the
microprocessor industry qualifies as an example of a firm accumulating concrete
“know what” in terms of technologies.  Likewise, two chemical businesses that
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share a common knowledge and research arena in organic chemistry also illustrates
an example of “content” learning in scientific research.
Environmental learning is defined as the firm’s accumulation of the elusive
“know how” knowledge gained from its experiences managing businesses in
different decision-making environments.  Environments can vary along different
dimensions and three have continued to stand out in the literature, including
munificence, complexity and dynamism (Emery & Trist, 1965; Terreberry, 1968;
Dess & Beard, 1984).  Environmental learning taps into the notion of the dominant
logic, defined as a way of thinking or managing in a given business (Prahalad &
Bettis, 1986).  For instance, understanding “how to manage” in the dynamic
microprocessor business constitutes an example of environmental learning.
 Second, a firm’s scope decision is defined as any strategic business unit
diversification/entry or divestment/exit by the organization.  For instance, if a firm
adds a new business, it changes its scope.
In the following hypotheses I link the firm’s scope choices, entry and exit,
to two main determinants: product-market relatedness and environmental
relatedness.
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3.1 Direction of entry
3.1.1 Hypothesis 1 – Product-market relatedness and entry
Received research suggests that firms are heterogeneous with respect to
their resources and capabilities (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991).
A firm’s resources can be tangible, such as plants, land and equipment, or
intangible, such as technological skills, brand equity, or corporate culture.
Researchers have argued that a firm’s resources can also include its special
knowledge, which is created over time through the experiences that the people in
the firm have interfacing with each other and the firm’s tangible and intangible
resources (Penrose, 1959).  Altogether, a firm’s resources remain dynamic and
unique from its personnel creating a constant interaction among its special
knowledge, capabilities and resources.
These interactions cause the firm to be in a continual state of flux, where its
resources and capabilities are repeatedly out of balance and suffer from unused
capacity.  A natural solution for the firm to resolve the tension created by its
inoperative resources is to keep finding new uses for them.  Penrose explains this
mechanism, where:
“many of the productive services created through an
increase in knowledge that occurs as a result of experience
gained in the operation of the firm as time passes will
remain unused if the firm fails to expand.  Thus they
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provide an internal inducement to expansion as well as new
possibilities for it” (Penrose, 1959, p.54)
Thus, related diversified expansion will help the firm to more fully utilize its
resources and secure a more balanced internal situation.
The Penrosian hypothesis suggests that a firm will expand in a direction
similar to its present resources so that it can take advantage of its existing links to
expand its base and strengthen its competitive position (Penrose, 1959).  More
specifically, a firm will select an entry choice where it can transfer its distinctive
resources and capabilities, thereby allowing it to build and maintain a competitive
advantage in the new business (Porter, 1987).  By the firm sharing its superior
resources across its businesses it creates more opportunities for itself to uncover
potential synergies, resulting in the firm’s resources accruing more value and
expanding its resource pool through new combinations of resources (Porter, 1985;
1987).  Thus, a firm’s current resources will dictate the direction of the firm’s
expansion efforts (Penrose, 1959).
Though an organization’s resources can be partitioned up into extensive
detail, researchers have recognized a firm’s physical resources as one of its most
important dimensions (Penrose, 1959; Gort, 1962; Chandler, 1962; Rumelt, 1974;
Teece, 1982).  A firm’s physical resources include its raw materials, plant,
equipment, land and natural resources.  When a firm’s target business is in a
direction that is related to the physical resources of its current businesses the
propinquity between the businesses allows for “similar or complementary uses of
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products, similar production processes, and the use of common raw materials for
the products…in short, it concerns relations between the physical characteristics of
products” (Gort, 1962, p.57).  Focusing in on a firm’s relations between the
physical characteristics of its products between its businesses is also known as a
“product-market” perspective; it is a more refined dimension of a firm’s resources,
derived from the broader physical resource dimension.
Researchers have theorized how companies have selected scope choices
based upon the efficiencies gained through product-market relatedness.  For
instance, Chandler described how industrial chemical companies engaged in related
diversification based upon product-market similarities to tap into the economies of
scale and scope, and how this type of expansion can mushroom into even greater
company-wide synergies:
“Increasingly, however, economies of scope within the
enterprise as a whole provided an even stronger dynamic
for growth.  One division was able to use intermediate
products produced or developed in others, to exploit
research and development information and techniques
perfected in other divisions, to apply knowledge acquired
in other divisions that used comparable production
technologies or served similar markets.  Most important of
all, the top and middle managers of these enterprises were
able to use their experience and skill in deciding on
products to be developed, in making the initial investment
in production facilities of the proper size, in creating a new
marketing network, and in recruiting the management
teams essential to achieve and maintain first-mover
advantages for their new products.  And the continuing
product development and commercialization further
improved the facilities and honed the skills that constituted
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the organizational capabilities of the enterprise as a whole”
(Chandler, 1990 edition, p.188).
Thus, a strong case has been made for the significance of product-market
relatedness as an important dimension of a firm’s resources.
If resource-based arguments are to predict the direction of diversification,
then it is likely that firms will enter those markets that have a physical relatedness
to their existing products so that they can utilize their excess resources to the
greatest possible extent (Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991; Chatterjee and
Wernerfelt, 1991).  Thus, product-market relatedness to their existing product
portfolio is likely to be a significant attractor for firms seeking to enter new
industries.  Based on the above arguments I suggest the following base hypothesis:
H1.  The closer the host and target industries are in terms of product-
market relatedness, the greater the likelihood that the firm will enter that
industry.
3.1.2 Hypothesis 2 – Environmental relatedness and entry
Within the strategic decision-making literature, it has been argued that
different environments place different cognitive challenges on a firm, causing the
organization to employ different decision-making processes.  The fit between a
firm’s environment and its decision-making processes is an important issue, for
research has shown that it can impact a firm’s subsequent decision effectiveness
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and performance (Dill, 1958; Duncan, 1972; Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Fredrickson
& Mitchell, 1984; Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989; Eisenhardt,
1989).  Therefore, a firm needs to recognize the environmental conditions and
make use of the most appropriate decision-making process for that particular
environment.
Environments can vary along different dimensions.  Though many
dimensions have been identified by researchers, three have continued to stand out
in the literature, including munificence, complexity, and dynamism (Emery &
Trist, 1965; Terreberry, 1968; Dill, 1958; Duncan, 1972; Tosi, Aldag, & Storey,
1973; Jurkovich, 1974; Tung, 1979; Dess & Beard, 1984).  Environmental
munificence refers to the ability of the environment to support sustained growth
(Starbuck, 1976; Dess &  Beard, 1984).  Environmental complexity refers to “the
heterogeneity of and range of an organization’s activities” (Child, 1972, p.3).
Environmental dynamism taps into the level of unpredictable turbulence in the
environment, where higher levels of unpredictable turbulence generate more
uncertainty and instability in the environment (Emery & Trist, 1965; Duncan, 1972;
Jurkovich, 1974; Dess & Beard, 1984).  Extensive objective measures of these
three environmental dimensions have been successfully identified in the literature
(Dess & Beard, 1984).
A decision-making process that is useful in one context may be less useful
in another.  For instance, if an organization is used to managing its businesses in
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environments that have low levels of turbulence, the organization may use its stable
and predictable situation to employ a high level of comprehensiveness in its
decision-making processes (Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984;
Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989).  If the firm enters a new business that has a
significantly higher level of turbulence, a comprehensive decision-making process
may be inappropriate in this new situation, and could hurt the firm’s performance
(Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984).  Or the firm may need to modify its
comprehensive decision-making processes, where in high velocity environments, it
learns how to quickly speed along through the barrage of information and advice
seeking to better adjust and compensate to the higher levels of turbulence
(Eisenhardt, 1989).
When seeking to expand to more fully utilize its resources and secure a
more balanced internal situation, firms would like to enter businesses that are
similar in product-market (as per Hypothesis One).  Additionally, target businesses
with environments that would match with the existing management decision-
making processes of the firm would be especially attractive as a way to utilize the
unused capacity of administrative talent in the firm.  Though researchers have
acknowledged the role that management plays in trying to make the best use of the
firm’s resources, they often forget the importance of management as a resource.  As
Penrose explains, “the experience of management will affect the productive
services that all its other resources are capable of rendering” (Penrose, 1959, p.5).
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Thus, the management teams’ environmental exposure has directly shaped their
decision-making processes and subsequent choices, and this can be seen as an
important yet overlooked component to the scope selection process.
For instance, a potential scope selection may share a lot of product-market
similarities with the firm’s existing businesses, such as similar inputs,
manufacturing processes, and distribution channels.  However, it is imperative that
the firm also evaluate the potential scope selection in terms of environmental
similarities with the firm’s existing businesses; this includes what environmental
contexts the target business brings with it, in terms of the three environmental
dimensions of munificence, dynamism and complexity.  If the firm is targeting a
scope selection that offers an environment that the firm has not had previous
experience with or where the firm has not been successful in, it may be selecting a
mismatched choice.  The different environment of the target business may require
the firm to learn and develop new strategic decision-making processes, routines and
mental models in order to successful manage the new business.  Similarly, if there
is a close fit between the environment of the potential scope selection and the
environments of the firm’s existing businesses, the target business will be an
attractive entry candidate.
Hypothesis One focused on the product-market aspects of resources that
might explain diversification entry.  However, ideally a firm would like to expand
into markets where all of its resources could be used, including the environmental
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knowledge embodied in its management team regarding specific environments.
My process argument absorbs and builds upon Prahalad and Bettis’s dominant
logic argument, and it is my hope that my claim will empirically validate their
conclusion that “relatedness may be as much a cognitive concept as it is economic
and technical” (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986, p.499).  I predict that the firm will be
influenced to select choices that complement the learning it acquired from its
previous experiences, resulting in the firm’s experiences being environmentally
related.
Based on the above analysis, the following relationship is suggested:
H2.  The closer the host and target industries are in terms of
environmental relatedness, the greater the likelihood that the firm
will enter that industry.
3.1.3 Hypothesis 3 – Product-market and environmental relatedness and
entry
I claim that a potential scope choice needs to be evaluated against a firm’s
past experiences in terms of both product-market learning and environmental
learning.  A target business can differ from a firm’s existing businesses along two
approaches.  First, the product-market knowledge of a firm’s experiences may
differ with what is required to successfully compete in the new potential selection.
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Second, the environment of the potential scope choice can be different in terms of
munificence, dynamism, and complexity.  Firms should assess a potential scope
choice for relatedness in both product-market and environmental areas to ensure the
appropriate application of its prior learning.  For instance, mainframe computers
and personal computers may both require an understanding of the same computing
technology and manufacturing processes (product-market learning).  Yet, the actual
competitive environment in these two industries may be widely different and may
demand very distinct organizational decision-making processes, routines, and
dominant logics (environmental learning).  To give another example in the opposite
direction, pharmaceutical and chemical firms compete in a similar dynamic
environment (environmental learning).  However, the distribution channels,
products and technologies used are very different (product-market learning).
Thus, even though firms that have participated in a business may have a
good understanding of the product-market knowledge required for the target
business, without an understanding of the environmental know how required (or
vice versa) to compete in the new business in terms of decision-making processes
and mental models, an expansion into such new businesses would not be the best
suited match for the firms.  Thus, in order to best leverage its learning, the firm will
select choices that are related in both product-market and environmental learning.
This suggests the following hypothesis:
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H3.  Product-market and environmental relatedness, together, will
have the strongest influence on the direction of a firm’s entry
choices.
3.1.4 Hypothesis 4 – Focus on product-market in entry
While I argue that the relatedness in both types of learning is important to
the success of a firm’s business addition and development efforts, I propose that
managers are more likely to focus on product-market issues in deciding the
direction of diversification rather than the environmental aspects of this set of
decisions.   In other words, managers are more likely to ignore environmental
unrelatedness than product-market unrelatedness.   The literatures on strategic
issues and acquisition process specifically, and the strategy literature more
generally, suggest this primacy of “content issues” over “process issues” in the
context of many firm decisions.  For instance, in the strategy literature,
diversification and divestment issues have primarily been considered part of the
territory of the strategy content camp and the resultant literature has focused largely
on the content aspects of relatedness in products and markets (Ramanujam and
Varadarajan, 1989).
From a managerial decision-making perspective too, acquisitions and
divestitures are more likely to be evaluated in terms of strategy content and
financial analysis, than with respect to the actual strategic process and process
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related issues for at least two reasons (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Jemison and
Sitkin, 1986).  First, managers may fail to recognize the importance of process
issues, as such issues may not be easily quantifiable or cognitively salient.
Research in strategic issue diagnosis and cognition has noted that certain issues are
likely to be perceived as “top of the head phenomena” that merit immediate and
complete attention (Cowan, 1986; Dutton, Stumpf and Wagner, 1990; Taylor and
Fiske, 1978).  Resources devoted to considering problems are related to the
perceived salience of the problem (Dutton, Stumpf and Wagner, 1990).  Second,
even when managers recognize the importance of the organizational or process
elements of a business expansion decision, the very process of analyzing,
negotiating with and acquiring another firm may prevent detailed consideration of
these process elements (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986).  For these reasons I suggest:
H4.  Firms are more likely to focus on product-market issues than
environmental issues.  Therefore product-market relatedness will
have a stronger influence on the direction of a firm’s entry choices
than environmental relatedness.
3.2 Direction of exit
3.2.1 Hypothesis 5 – Product-market relatedness and exit
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As mentioned in section 3.1.1, a firm’s pool of resources will dictate the
direction of its future scope choices.  I argue in this section that a firm’s
underutilized resources and capabilities will also drive a firm’s exit choices.  Two
sets of arguments suggest that businesses in product markets that are most distant
from the firm’s resource profile will be exited earliest.  The first argument relates to
the notion of the firm’s pool of resources.  Since a firm’s pool of resources is ever
evolving, this can lead to the condition where some of a firm’s past selections will
not always match with where the firm’s pool of resources is directing the firm to go
to today.  Since these past selections are in areas most distant from the firm’s
current pool, they can contribute the least to it.  When a firm’s past scope choices
do not utilize the firm’s current pool of resources, the organization can no longer
gain efficiency benefits from them.  Further, keeping these past selections up and
running may demand the most attention since they are in areas that are not an easy
fit with the rest of the firm, turning these past selections into resource drains rather
than resource generators.  Thus, firms would prefer to exit from these now
unrelated choices.  Second, businesses that are most distant from a firm’s resource
profile are likely to see the negative effects of unrelated diversification earlier.
Poor performance in these units will draw attention to them and motivate a
reconsideration of their place in the overall portfolio of the firm.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
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H5.  The farther the host and target industries are in terms of
product-market relatedness, the greater the likelihood that the firm
will exit that industry.
3.2.2 Hypothesis 6 – Environmental relatedness and exit
Just as it is important that the firm’s businesses are related in terms of
product-market knowledge in order for it to gain efficiency benefits, so too should
there be a match among its businesses in terms of environmental knowledge.  If a
business requires knowledge that is different from the environmental knowledge
embodied in the firm’s dominant logic, the firm will not be successful in managing
that business.  As Prahalad and Bettis explain:
“The ability of a top management group (a group of key
individuals), to manage a diversified firm is limited by the dominant
general management logic(s) that they are used to.  In other words,
the repertoire of tools that top managers use to identify, define, and
make strategic decisions, and their view of the world (mind sets), is
determined by their experiences” (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986, p.490).
Poor performance will trigger a firm into “search mode” for answers on how to
solve this problem.  Unfortunately, just as the firm’s dominant logic helps it to
function by avoiding cognitive overload, it also determines what information the
organization will pay attention to, how it will interpret that information, and will
limit the range of solutions it will identify (Cyert & March, 1963; Duhaime &
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Schwenk, 1985; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Barr, Stimpert & Huff, 1992).  Thus,
altering a firm’s dominant logic or having the firm add on an entirely new one is
quite a challenge for the organization.  Furthermore, having the firm try to
accomplish this under performance pressures from the environmentally unrelated
business only compounds the undertaking.  If a firm cannot successfully “turn the
business around” by gaining this new learning, it will divest it (Prahalad & Bettis,
1986).  As a result, similarity among a firm’s businesses with respect to
environmental knowledge is also important.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H6.  The farther the host and target industries are in terms of
environmental relatedness, the greater the likelihood that the firm
will exit that industry.
3.2.3 Hypothesis 7 – Product-market and environmental relatedness and exit
As I mentioned in section 3.2.2, environmental unrelatedness is amorphous
and difficult to recognize due to the fact that the firm is already operating under a
dominant logic (or logics) that determines what information the organization will
pay attention to, how it will interpret that information, and will limit the range of
solutions it will identify (Cyert & March, 1963; Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985;
Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Barr, Stimpert & Huff, 1992).  Combining this with the
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acknowledgment that product-market issues have more salience over environmental
issues among managers because of the increased visibility through strategic
management books, consulting firms, and the popular business press, product-
market unrelated scope candidates are the more obvious choices for managers to
axe.  In contrast product-market unrelatedness is more visible and obvious –
recognizing that product-markets bear little relationship to each other is generally
more obvious than recognizing the subtler differences that environmental
unrelatedness entails.
All of a firm’s businesses will fall into one of four possible combinations of
product-market and environmental unrelatedness.  Businesses can be related in both
product-market and environment, unrelated in both product-market and
environment, related in product-market but unrelated in environment, related in
environment but unrelated in product-market.  Businesses that are unrelated in both
product-market and environment are likely to see the worst possible performance.
These businesses will be divested the earliest.  Businesses that are related in both
product-market and environment can generally be expected to perform the best.
Such businesses are also likely to be regarded as the core of the company  (Gort,
1962) and least likely to be divested.  Businesses that are environmentally related
but product-market unrelated and product-market related but environmentally
unrelated are likely to lie between these two extremes.  Specifically, businesses that
are product-market unrelated and environmentally related, will be divested before
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businesses that are product-market related but environmentally unrelated, because,
as argued before, the salience of product-market issues will cause them to be more
easily observed and acted upon.  Thus, I hypothesize:
H7.  Firms are more likely to focus on product-market issues than
environmental issues.  Therefore, they will select exit choices in
industries largely based on product-market unrelatedness rather
than environmental unrelatedness. Specifically, firms will exit
businesses in the following order – (1) product-market unrelated,
environmental unrelated, (2) product-market unrelated,
environmental related, (3) product-market related, environment
unrelated, (4) product-market related, environment related.
3.2.4 Hypotheses 8 – Relating entry and exit
In my final hypothesis I establish the relationship between business entry
and business exit.  Each business entry presents the firm with an opportunity to
learn about the new business (Chang, 1996).  However, such learning is likely to be
most significant when the new business shares elements of knowledge with the old
business (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  When firms expand into new businesses but
fail to account for the distance between their existing businesses and their new
selection, the new entry is more likely to fail.  If firms do want to expand from one
set of businesses to add a new set of distant businesses the expansion is more likely
to be successful if the firm proceeds in a sequential fashion, acquiring businesses
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that lie at some distance, but not as far as the targeted businesses, before entering
the targeted businesses.  More generally, I predict:
H8a.  The smaller the average distance in product-market
relatedness between successive entries into businesses, the lower the
likelihood of exit.
H8b. The smaller the average distance in environmental relatedness
between successive entries into businesses, the lower the likelihood
of exit.
Appendix A presents a summary of the hypotheses introduced in this
chapter.  My eight hypotheses draw from the resource-based view, organizational
learning, evolutionary economics, path dependence and strategic decision-making
literatures.
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4 Methods and measures
This chapter describes the research methods used in the dissertation.  The
chapter is divided into three sections.  The first section describes the data collection
and the sample details.  In the second section, the variable definitions are presented.
The third section specifies the models which will be used in testing the hypotheses,
and describes the statistical methods.
4.1 Data collection and sample details
I test the hypotheses on a longitudinal data set of diversified firms
competing in multiple industries.  Longitudinal data from the study period of 1981
to 1989 allows for the testing of the causal arguments as well as the dynamic
aspects of the firm’s evolution.  This dissertation relies on four major data sources
to empirically test the hypotheses: the TRINET historical database, the
COMPUSTAT annual industry file, the U.S. Bureau of the Census’s Census of
Manufacturers file and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Input-Output
Structure of the U.S. Economy data set.     
The TRINET database is a commercial database that provides information
at the establishment level.  It is an enormous database, covering 7.5 million
establishments of roughly 35,000 companies in the United States.  This translates to
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about 85% of the national economic activities and virtually all publicly traded
companies in the United States.  The dataset is available for the years of 1981,
1983, 1985, 1987, and 1989.  I use the TRINET database to obtain information on
the sales of a firm’s businesses in the United States by 4-digit Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) code.  I aggregate the establishment-based TRINET
information into the 4-digit industry level.  Based upon this information, I am able
to trace a firm’s entry and exit from a business within a 4-digit SIC industry.
The COMPUSTAT annual industry file contains financial data on more
than 6,000 companies publicly traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and ASE and is
compiled from the firms’ annual reports and 10-K reports to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).  I used the COMPUSTAT database to obtain time-
series financial data information on firms’ total assets, long-term debt, common
equity, current assets, current liabilities, net income, advertising expense, capital
expenditures and sales.
The U.S. Bureau of the Census’s Census of Manufacturers file profiles the
manufacturing sector of the US economy, as defined in the Standard Industrial
Classification Manual.  It is a comprehensive file that includes comparative
statistics for industries, states and standard metropolitan statistical areas, collected
at the establishment level.  The data set is available every five years, for years
ending with a “2” or “7”.  I used the Census of Manufacturers file to collect
information on the growth, instability and geographical concentration of a
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manufacturing industry using one or more of the following: total sales, price-cost
margin, total employment, value added by manufacture, and number of
manufacturing establishments.  This data set also provided information on sales
concentration and specialization ratios.
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Input-Output Structure of the U.S.
Economy dataset provides detailed information on the flows of goods and services
to industries for the production of gross output.  These accounts provide detailed
information on the flows of the goods and services that make up the production
process of industries.  The data set is available every five years, for years ending in
a “2” or “7”.  I used the Input-Output Structure of the U.S. Economy tables to
collect the information necessary to compose the measures of: concentration of
inputs, concentration of outputs, impact of all other industries on the output of a
given industry and the relative power of indirectly linked factors on output.       
I matched up all of the databases (TRINET, COMPUSTAT, U.S. Bureau of
the Census’s Census of Manufacturers, and the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis’s Input-Output Structure of the U.S. Economy) for my sample of firms.
My sample includes only domestic manufacturing companies from the Fortune 250,
where a domestic company refers to a firm whose headquarters are located in the
United States.  This results in a sample size of 106 firms.  Firms are identified as
manufacturing companies when their main business is reported as manufacturing in
the COMPUSTAT database (main SIC code is between 2000 to 3999), as well as in
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the Fortune 500 listing.  I limit the study to manufacturing firms, at the exclusion of
service firms, because the service sector relies on a distinct set of skills and
knowledge than manufacturing industries.  This makes a comparison between
manufacturing and service firms difficult; I thereby avoid such problems.
4.2 Variable definitions and operationalizations
In this section, the variables of the study are discussed.  I will first discuss
the two dependent variables of the study, entry and exit (4.2.1).  Independent and
control variables are introduced next (4.2.2 and 4.2.3).  The variables of the study
are collected for the years 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987 and 1989.
4.2.1 Dependent variables
Entry.  The dependent variable in Hypotheses 1,2, 3 and 4 is the probability
that firm k will enter industry j, or Pkj.  Entry is measured as a 0 or 1 variable,
depending on whether or not the firm entered a given industry after 1981.
Exit.  The dependent variable in Hypotheses 5,6,7 and 8 is the likelihood
that firm k will divest one of its businesses in industry j, or Lkj.  Exit is measured as
a 0 or 1 variable, depending on whether or not the firm exited a given industry after
1981.
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4.2.2 Independent variables
Product-market relatedness.  Product-market relatedness is defined as the
closeness between the firm’s existing industries and the target industry.  I
incorporate the product-market relatedness variable developed by Sharma &
Kesner (1996) and also used by Chang & Singh (1999).  It is computed as the sales-
weighted concentric diversification index.  “Let dil be a weight whose value
depends on the distance between the entered industry i and the other industries I in
which the parent has operations.  dil  has the value of 2 if i and I are within the same
3-digit SIC code, 1 if i and I are within the same 2-digit SIC, and 0 if i and I are in
different 2-digit SIC industries.  Let Pkl  be the percentage of firm k’s sales that is in
industry I defined at the 4-digit SIC industry level.  The product-market relatedness
is defined as ÂI =1,…L  (Pkl)dil.  This measure reflects the product-market
relatedness between the entrant business and all the other industries in which its
parent had operations at the time of the diversifying entry” (Chang & Singh, 1999,
p.1027).
Environmental relatedness.  To proxy the similarity between the firm’s
existing and new decision-making environment, I compare the host firm’s existing
environment with the targeted industry’s environment in terms of Dess and Beard’s
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dimensions of munificence, complexity and dynamism.  I was able to obtain
information on 20 out of the original 23 measures Dess & Beard had used in their
1984 study to compose each of the three dimensions.
Environmental munificence similarity: I used six measures of this construct
based on growth in total sales, growth in price-cost margin, growth in total
employment, growth in value added by manufacture, growth in number of
manufacturing establishments and sales concentration, respectively.  I used the
following formula:
Growth in Total Sales Similarityi =(GTSij – GTSin)
2
where GTSij = Growth in total sales of Target Industry j and GTSin=
weighted average of growth in total sales for all industries that firm i is currently
active in.
For example, to calculate the measure based on growth in total sales I
computed the weighted average level of growth in total sales for the industries the
firm is currently participating in (with the proportion of corporate sales in each
industry serving as the weights) and I take the difference of this rate from the target
industry’s growth rate and square it (to capture deviations positive or negative).
Similar measures are constructed for growth in price-cost margin, growth in total
employment, growth in value added by manufacture, growth in number of
manufacturing establishments and sales concentration.  These data are obtained
from the U.S. Bureau of the Census’s Census of Manufacturers file.
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Environmental complexity similarity: I used eight measures to proxy the
degree to which the firm’s environment is characterized by
homogeneity/heterogeneity and concentration/dispersion (Dess and Beard, 1984).
The core idea underlying the Dess and Beard measures is that industries marked by
high levels of geographic dispersion and heterogeneity in product offerings are
likely to entail more complex decision-making environments.  The eight measures
include: concentration of inputs; diversity of products; specialization ratio;
concentration of outputs; geographical concentration of total sales; geographical
concentration of value added by manufactures, geographical concentration of total
employment and geographical concentration of industry establishments.  For
instance, to measure the diversity of products in the industry I use the dollar
volume of 7-digit SIC products and compute the Herfindahl index of sales
volumes:
Product Diversity = 1-S (Sales from i
th 7-digit industry / Total sales of the
corresponding 4-digit industry)2
The higher the value of the product diversity index, the more complex the
industry.  To get the measure of product diversity similarity, which is my proxy for
the degree to which the firm’s existing and target environments are similar I
construct the following variable:
Product Diversity Similarity= (PDij – PDin)
2
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where PDij = Product Diversity of Target Industry j and PDin= weighted
average of product diversity for all industries that firm i is currently active in.
Similar measures are constructed for the other seven variables.  These data are
obtained U.S. Bureau of the Census’s Census of Manufacturers and the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Input-Output Structure of the U.S. Economy.
Environmental dynamism similarity: I used six measures of this construct
based on the instability in total sales, instability in price-cost margin, instability in
total employment, instability in value added by manufacture, impact of all other
industries on output of a given industry, and relative power of indirectly linked
factors on output.  Industries that have high volume instability can be characterized
as more dynamic.  To measure sales unpredictability I use the coefficient of
variation in total industry sales.  Again, since my interest is in how the environment
is different across the existing and target industries, I compute the following
measure of Sales Unpredictability Similarity: =(SUij – SUin)
2
where SUij = Coefficient of Variation in Sales of Target Industry j and SUin=
weighted average of Coefficient of Variation in Sales for all industries that firm i is
currently active in.
Similar measures are constructed for the other five variables.  These data
are obtained U.S. Bureau of the Census’s Census of Manufacturers and the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Input-Output Structure of the U.S. Economy.
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Average product-market relatedness between entries.  This measure is
computed by: (1) taking the target’s product-market relatedness score, and (2)
summing it with all the other target entries’ product-market relatedness scores
before it (up to that period), and (3) then dividing that total by the number of
entries.  This results in a number that reflects the average product-market
relatedness between entries.  Please see the numerical example below (Table 1).
Average environmental relatedness between entries.  This measure is
computed by: (1) taking the target’s environmental relatedness score, and (2)
summing it with all the other target entries’ environmental relatedness scores
before it (up to that period), and (3) then dividing that total by the number of
entries.  This results in a number that reflects the average environmental relatedness
between entries.
The following numerical example (Table 1) is used to help clarify both of
the average relatedness measures.  In the following example, I demonstrate how the
average environmental relatedness between entries measure is constructed for two
firms.  The two firms in my example are identified in the first column (Firm) –
Firm 1 and Firm 2.  Column Two (Yr) indicates the year that the entry took place
(1983 –1989).  Column 3 (sic4) shows the 4-digit SIC code the target entry belongs
to (2011-3999).  Column Four (EnvRel) shows the firm’s Environmental
relatedness score (note that this could just as easily be the firm’s Product-market
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relatedness score as well).  For instance, for Firm 1 in Row 1, its 1983 selection of
2011 (target business) combined with the firm’s existing businesses result in an
environmental relatedness score of 4.5.  Column Five (AvgEnvRel) displays the
firm’s Average environmental relatedness between entries score.  Column’s Six
through Column 13 show how all of the firm’s other target entries’ environmental
relatedness scores are used to compute the AvgEnvRel score (Column Five).  For
example, the Average environmental relatedness between entries score for Firm
1’s entry into business 2014 in 1985 (fourth observation, Row 4, in bold), was
calculated by summing (5, 4.5, 5, and 7), and dividing by 4, for a score of 5.37500.
73
Table 1: Average Environmental Relatedness
Firm Yr sic4
Env
Rel
Avg
EnvRel
ENTER
_1
ENTER
_2
ENTER
_3
ENTER
_4
ENTER
_5
ENTER
_6
ENTER
_7
ENTER
_8
1 1983 2011 4.50 4.50000 . . . . . . . .
1 1983 2012 5.00 5.00000 . . . . . . . .
1 1983 2013 7.00 7.00000 . . . . . . . .
1 1985 2014 5.00 5.37500 4.5 5 7.0 . . . . .
1 1985 2015 6.50 5.75000 4.5 5 7.0 . . . . .
1 1985 2016 7.50 6.00000 4.5 5 7.0 . . . . .
1 1987 2017 7.25 6.10714 4.5 5 7.0 5.0 6.5 7.5 . .
1 1987 2019 6.00 5.92857 4.5 5 7.0 5.0 6.5 7.5 . .
1 1989 2018 4.75 5.94444 4.5 5 7.0 5.0 6.5 7.5 7.25 6
2 1983 3011 5.50 5.50000 . . . . . . . .
2 1983 3012 6.00 6.00000 . . . . . . . .
2 1983 3013 7.50 7.50000 . . . . . . . .
2 1985 3014 5.50 6.12500 5.5 6 7.5 . . . . .
2 1985 3015 4.50 5.87500 5.5 6 7.5 . . . . .
2 1985 3016 5.50 6.12500 5.5 6 7.5 . . . . .
2 1987 3017 6.25 5.82143 5.5 6 7.5 5.5 4.5 5.5 . .
2 1987 3019 8.00 6.07143 5.5 6 7.5 5.5 4.5 5.5 . .
2 1989 3018 2.75 5.72222 5.5 6 7.5 5.5 4.5 5.5 6.25 8
4.2.3 Control variables
(a) Firm-level controls
Firm size.  Log of total assets, measured at time t – 1 of entry or exit.  Firm
size is controlled for to account for any size effects on entry or exit activities.
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Leverage ratio.  Book value of long-term debt to market value of equity,
measured at time t – 1 of entry or exit.  Leverage ratio is included to control for the
financial resources of the firm that may affect entry and exit decisions.
Liquidity ratio.  Current assets divided by current liabilities, measured at
time t – 1 of entry or exit.  Liquidity ratio is included as another control for the
financial resources of the firm that may affect entry and exit decisions.
Return on assets.  Net income divided by total assets.
Diversification.  Berry-Herfindahl index of the firm’s diversification
defined as one minus Âi=1,…Pi2, where Pi is the proportion of sales in the ith
business defined at the 4-digit SIC level, measured at time t of entry or exit.  This is
to control for the extent of the firm’s diversification.
(b) Industry-level controls
The following are several industrial market structure variables frequently
used in prior studies on diversification.  Industrial market structure is controlled for
because it determines the relative attractiveness of entry or exit.
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Advertising intensity. Advertising expenses divided by sales (Montgomery
& Hariharan, 1991; Sharma & Kesner, 1996;).
Capital intensity. Capital expenditures divided by sales (Montgomery &
Hariharan, 1991; Sharma & Kesner, 1996).
.
Market concentration.  Eight firm concentration ratio from the U.S. Bureau
of the Census’s Census of Manufacturers (Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991;
Sharma & Kesner, 1996; Chang, 1996; Chang & Singh, 1999).
4.3 Study design
4.3.1 Principal components analysis with respect to the environmental
variables
The environmental relatedness measure of my study compares the host
firm’s existing environment with the target’s environment in terms of Dess &
Beard’s dimensions for munificence, complexity and dynamism.  I was able to
obtain information on 20 out of the original 23 measures Dess & Beard had used in
their 1984 study.  Furthermore, I was able to collect this information for all of the
4-digit SIC’s in manufacturing (this includes 483 4-digit manufacturing industries
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between SIC 2011 and 3999; Dess & Beard had used a sample of 52 4-digit
manufacturing industries), and for my entire time period, which covers the years
1981-1989.  Appendix B provides an abbreviated list of the 483 manufacturing 4-
digit SIC’s, as well as a description.
Given the magnitude of the environmental data collection effort, combined
with the desire of wanting to use the data to its full potential, I decided to replicate
the principal component analysis on the environmental variables which had been
originally conducted by Dess and Beard in 1984.  I hoped that I would be able to
reconfirm Dess & Beard’s original results.  Furthermore, now that I had a larger
and more current sample, in terms of the industries represented (483 vs. 52) and the
years covered (1981-1989 vs. 1968-1977), I had the means to potentially extend
them.  Appendix C provides a complete listing of the environmental variables,
including definitions, descriptions and data sources.
4.3.2 Model Specification
The hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 identify two dependent variables,
entry and exit.  Hypotheses 1-4 predict how product-market and environmental
relatedness affects where a firm will enter.  Hypotheses 5-8 predict how product-
market and environmental relatedness affects where a firm will exit.  The main
empirical method applied in this study is longitudinal regression analysis.  In each
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equation the appropriate dependent variable is regressed against a vector of
explanatory variables which include both hypothesized effects and control
variables.  A longitudinal research design is used, which pools the sample of firms
(i) over time (t).  Note that all independent variables are lagged by one year.  The
equation explaining entry can be written as follows:
Entry =  fn(Product-market relatedness; environmental relatedness;
product-market relatedness*environmental relatedness; controls)
The equation explaining exit can be written as follows:
Exit =  fn(Product-market relatedness; environmental relatedness;
product-market relatedness*environmental relatedness; average product-market
relatedness between entries; average environmental relatedness between entries;
controls)
4.3.2 Model Estimation
Empirical validation of the hypotheses is done through a longitudinal study.
I examine the sample of 106 firms over the period of 1981 to 1989.  The use of
longitudinal data for testing the hypotheses is needed for two reasons.  First, the
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direction of causality needs to be demonstrated.  Second, the lag between a firm’s
prior experience being absorbed by the firm as learning and then translated back
into its future scope decisions is likely to be a year or longer.  In this study, I lag all
independent variables by one year.
This study is interested in dependent variables that are categorical; do firms
enter and exit, or do they not.  I will use a logit regression model because it is a
widely used analytical method in the analysis of dichotomous choices.  Linear
regression methods work poorly for dichotomous Y variables because the errors are
not Gaussian (or do not have constant variance) and the linear predictions can
exceed the 0-1 boundaries.  In our study, the true relationship between the
probabilities and the predictor variables must be nonlinear.  Logit regression avoids
these problems by modeling the predicted probabilities as an S-shaped function (the
cumulative logistic regression distribution) of the predictor values.  I used the
random state-based sampling technique to construct a sample of firms that enter
and exit.  This is used for efficiency reasons due to the fact that the population is
dominated by one state (lack of entry and exit); logit estimation using data from
state-based sampling will yield unbiased and consistent betas for all variables
except the constant term (Manski & McFadden, 1981).
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5 Results
This chapter contains the results from the hypothesis testing.  In the first
section I discuss the results of the principal components analysis with respect to the
environmental variables.  In the second section, I present the main results of the
dissertation - the findings of the effects of product-market relatedness and
environmental relatedness on the scope decision of entry, and the findings of how
product-market relatedness and environmental relatedness affects the scope
decision of exit.  The results of the control variables are summarized in the third
section.  The key results of the dissertation are summarized in the last section.
5.1 Results of the Principal Components Analysis with Respect to the
Environmental Variables
The environmental relatedness measure of my study compares the host
firm’s existing environment with the target’s environment in terms of Dess &
Beard’s dimensions for munificence, complexity and dynamism.  I was able to
obtain information on 20 out of the original 23 measures Dess & Beard had used in
their 1984 study.  I conducted a principal components analysis followed by varimax
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rotation for the 20 environmental variables. 2  Appendix D shows these results (the
factors in Appendix D are ranked from left to right according to the proportion of
the variance they explain).  I applied the same factor analysis decision rules as Dess
& Beard had earlier, including that: (1) at least three variables must load together at
a level greater than or equal to .30 on each a priori factor, (2) the eigenvalue of any
common factor was required to be greater than or equal to one, and (3) factors were
required to exhibit a simple structure (Dess & Beard, 1984, p.61).  Following these
decision rules, particularly with respect to the second decision rule, five initial
factors were identified.  However, only three were interpretable and fit the simple
structure criteria.  In all, 55 percent of the total variance is explained with the three
factor solution.
Factor 1 consists of five variables, containing all of the geographic
concentration measures, including V15, V16, V17 and V18, as well as V6, Sales
concentration.  Four of these factor loadings met or exceeded .78, and the fifth
factor loading was well above the threshold level of .30 with a score of .56.  This
                                                 
2 A principal components analysis was employed to determine if the 20 variables used to
measure the three environmental dimensions would group together in the same fashion as
originally found by Dess and Beard in 1984.  In the few cases where there was missing
data, the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm was used to compute the maximum
likelihood estimates (MLE) parameters of a multivariate normal distribution (Dempster,
Laird, & Rubin, 1977; McLachlan & Krishnan, 1997).  The Expectation-Maximization
(EM) algorithm is a technique for obtaining maximum likelihood estimates in parametric
models for incomplete data.  The MLE’s were identified for the means and covariance
matrix of the 20 variables, assuming a multivariate normal distribution.  SAS PROC MI
was then employed; it uses the means and standard deviations from available cases as the
initial estimates for the EM algorithm.  The resulting covariance matrix was then used in
the principal components analysis.
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factor clearly appears to represent the Complexity dimension of the environment
and is similarly named in Appendix D.  This factor explains 19 percent of the total
variance.
Factor 2 consists of five variables, V1, V2, V3, V4 and V5, which represent
all but one of the munificence variables.  The loadings of these variables are also
quite high, where four out of the five factor loadings met or exceeded .88, and the
loading of the fifth variable was .48.  This factor strongly represents the
munificence dimension of the environment and is similarly named in Appendix D.
This factor also explains 19 percent of the total variance.
Factor 3 consists of four variables, V11, V12, V13 and V14, which all come
from the dimension of dynamism.  The loadings of these variables are very high at
.93, .92, .89, and .80.  This factor noticeably represents the dynamism dimension of
the environment and is similarly named in Appendix D.  This factor explains 17
percent of the total variance.
Dess and Beard’s final three dimensions comprised 14 of their original 23
environmental variables.  Similarly, the principal components analysis I conducted
reduced the environmental variables from 20 down to 14.  The three factors that
emerged confirm the conclusions obtained by Dess & Beard in that the
environment can be correctly characterized by the three dimensions: munificence,
complexity and dynamism.  This replication of the principal components analysis
on the environmental variables not only reconfirms Dess & Beard’s original results,
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but it extends them across additional industries (418 vs. 52) and time frames (1981-
1989 vs. 1968-1977).  I construct my measure of environmental relatedness in the
next analyses based on these results.
5.2 Results on Entry and Exit
In this section I first give a brief overview of the firms’ entry and exit
activity during 1981-1989.  Next I will discuss the descriptive statistics and
correlations of the independent variables.  In subsection 5.2.3 I discuss the results
of the empirical test on entry.  In subsection 5.2.4 I review the results of the
empirical test on exit.
5.2.1 Brief Overview of Entry and Exit
This dissertation is interested in both the entry and exit decisions of firms.
Appendix E provides a brief overview of the firms’ entry and exit activity during
1983-1989.  Our sample of 106 firms entered a total of 1730 manufacturing
industries from 1983-1989.  On average, each firm enters approximately 4.93 new
4-digit SIC manufacturing businesses per year.  Throughout the time period of this
study, each firm enters about 19.72 new businesses.  In terms of the percentage of
sales of those new entries contributing to the average total sales figures during
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1981-1989, the new entries represent 24 percent of total sales.  Our firms also
exited 1377 manufacturing industries from 1983-1989.  On average, each firm exits
approximately 4.18 4-digit SIC manufacturing businesses per year, since 1981.
Throughout the time period of this study, each firm exits about 16.72 businesses.
Exit from these businesses accounts for 29 percent of total sales.  This overview
shows that our sample of firms were quite active in entry and exit during 1981-
1989.  Appendix F provides a complete listing of all of the variables, including
definitions, descriptions and data sources.
5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Appendix G includes the descriptive statistics and correlations for all the
variables.  It is important to point out that even though most of the correlations are
low, many are significant because of the large sample size.  Any correlation below
.32 is explaining less than 10 percent of the variance.  The low correlation (.24)
between Product-market relatedness kt-1 and Environmental relatedness kt-1 is
noteworthy: it indicates that these two variables represent two distinct types of
relatedness.
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5.2.3 Results on Entry – Hypotheses 1,2,3 and 4
The GEE logit regression results of the effects of product-market
relatedness and environmental relatedness on entry in the manufacturing sector
during 1981-1989 are displayed in Appendix H.  Two out of four hypotheses are
supported (H1 and H4).  I use the statistical package SAS 9.0 to estimate all
models.
A total of 1730 cases of 4-digit SIC entry events are used in the GEE logit
regression.  In contrast to the 1730 entry events, there were 195,747 valid instances
of non-entry events.  There are 483 4-digit manufacturing industries in the standard
industry classification, which can be potential targets entry.  The following
calculation (Table 2) demonstrates where the 195,747 instances of non-entry events
come from:
Table 2: Total Number of Possible Firm-Industry Combinations
(106 firms x 483 4-digit SIC industries x 4 years - 83, 85, 87 and 89) = 204,792
- actual entry events 1,730
- firms’ participation of industries as of 1981 7,315
Total non-entry events 195,747
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I employed the state-based random sampling technique to construct our
sample of entries and non-entries (Manski & McFadden, 1981).  This way, the non-
entry cases will not dominate the entry cases.  All independent and control
variables are lagged by one year.  The logit model estimates the coefficients for the
entry option while setting the coefficients of the non-entry option as zero.
Therefore, we must interpret the estimated coefficients as the marginal effects of
the covariates leading to the choice of entry option over the non-entry option. 3
In Appendix H the first column reports the base model where Firm size kt-1,
Leverage ratio kt-1, Liquidity ratio kt-1, Return on assets kt-1, Diversification kt-1,
Advertising intensity kt-1, Capital intensity kt-1, and Market concentration kt-1 are
included as control variables.  Model Two introduces Product-market relatedness
kt-1 to investigate its effect on entry.  Model Three introduces the Environmental
                                                 
3 The data analysis involved examining the impact of industry controls, firm controls,
product market relatedness (PMR), and environmental relatedness (ENVR).  The analysis
used a generalized linear model with the outcome modeled as a binomial distribution
(McCullagh & Nelder, 1989).  The binomial distribution involved two discrete events;
entry or non-entry into a particular industry.  The logit link function was used in the
analysis (Allison, 1995).  In addition, the generalized linear model incorporated the
Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) model (Liang & Zeger, 1986), to account for the
variation in entry choice due to the potential firm similarity.  In the GEE approach, any
required covariance structure and link function can be assumed and parameters estimated
without specifying the joint distribution.  Since the parameters specifying the structure of
the correlation matrix are rarely of great practical interest, an exchangeable structure will
be used to model the within-firm similarity.  The exchangeable structure implies that each
potential entry is equally correlated.  Liang and Zeger (1986) showed that even when the
working correlation matrix was incorrectly specified, the parameter estimates are still
valid.  This approach is also identified as a marginal generalized linear model and appears
useful in analyzing non-independent categorical data (Lipsitz, Fitzmaurice, Orav, & Laird,
1994; Lipsitz, Kim, & Zhao, 1994). The models were fit using the SAS GENMOD
procedure.
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relatedness kt-1 variable.  Model Four contains the interaction effects of Product-
market relatedness kt-1 and Environmental relatedness kt-1 .  I discuss the results
based on the full model (Model Four) in Appendix H.  The log likelihood estimates
indicating the fit of each model are given at the bottom of the table.
In Hypothesis 1 I proposed that product-market relatedness has a positive
effect on the likelihood of entry.  Model Four in Appendix H provides a test for this
hypothesis and supports the proposition.  After controlling for a variety of firm and
industry characteristics, the estimated coefficient for the Product-market
relatedness kt-1 variable is positive and significant in Model Four, supporting the
hypothesis that the closer the host and target industries are in terms of product-
market relatedness, the greater the likelihood that the firm will enter that industry.
Hypothesis 2 proposed a positive relationship between environmental
relatedness and entry, and this hypothesis is not supported in Model Four.  The
estimated coefficient for the Environmental relatedness kt-1 variable is negative and
significant in Model Four, thus suggesting a negative relationship between
environmental relatedness and entry.  I examine the possible explanations for this
negative effect in Section 5.5.
In Hypothesis 3 I proposed that product-market relatedness and
environmental relatedness leverage each other, resulting in a combined positive
effect on entry.  The estimated coefficient for Product-market relatedness kt-1  *
Environmental relatedness kt-1 is negative and significant.  Thus, the hypothesis
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that product-market relatedness and environmental relatedness, together, will have
the strongest influence on the direction of a firm’s entry choices is not supported.  I
examine the possible explanations for this negative effect in Section 5.5.
Hypothesis 4 proposed that firms will be more likely to focus on product-
market issues than environmental issues – therefore, product-market relatedness
will have a stronger influence on the direction of a firm’s entry choices than
environmental relatedness.  The standardized beta coefficients for these variables in
Model Four in Appendix H provide a test for this hypothesis.  The coefficient on
Product-market relatedness kt-1  is .87, whereas the coefficient on Environmental
relatedness kt-1 is only -.11.  The larger beta coefficient on product-market
relatedness supports the idea that firms will be more influenced by product-market
relatedness than environmental relatedness in their entry decisions.
 
5.2.4 Results on Exit – Hypotheses 5, 6, 7 and 8a-b
The GEE logit regression results on the effects of product-market
relatedness and environmental relatedness on exit in the manufacturing sector
during 1981-1989 are reported in Appendix I. 4  Three of the five hypotheses (H5,
                                                 
4 The only difference for the exit analysis was to use the complementary log-log (cloglog)
link function instead of the logit link function. Although the logit and cloglog functions
produce almost identical results when the risk for a transition is low in discrete time
models (Singer & Willett, 2003), the cloglog function has the advantage of providing the
closest similarity to a continuous time model which has been used in prior research (see
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H6, H8a) are supported, leaving two hypotheses (H7 and H8b) not supported.  I
again use the statistical package SAS 9.0 to estimate all models.
My sample of 106 firms participated in a total of 2385 4-digit
manufacturing industries as of 1981.  Only firms’ first exit from a 4-digit
manufacturing industry was used in the GEE logit analysis.  A total of 1377 cases
of 4-digit SIC exit events were used in the analysis.  This represents 57 percent of
the original 2385 4-digit manufacturing industries.  In contrast to the 1377 exit
events, there were 7522 valid instances of non-exit events.  The following
calculation (Table 3) shows where the 7522 instances of non-exit events come
from:
Table 3: Breakdown of Valid Instances of Non-Exit Events.
106 firms participation in 4-digit SIC industries as of 19815: 2385
Exit
events
4-digit SIC’s remaining as
possible exit choices
Non-Exit
events
1983
221 actual cases of exit, with 2385
possible exit choices to exit out of 221 2385 2385
1985
436 actual cases of exit, with 2164
possible exit choices
436 2385 – 221 = 2164 2164
1987
483 actual cases of exit, with 1728
possible exit choices
483 2164 – 436 = 1728 1728
1989
237 actual cases of exit, with 1245
possible exit choices
237 1728 – 237 = 1245 1245
                                                                                                                                        
Chang, 1996).  The estimated parameters using the cloglog link function have the same
interpretation as relative risks as the Cox regression model and the model is invariant to
interval length (Allison, 1995).
5 Firms can only exit a 4-digit SIC code once.
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Totals: 1377 7522
Again, to compensate for the disproportionate number of actual exit events
to non-exit events, I employed the state-based random sampling technique to
construct our sample of exits to non-exits (Manski & McFadden, 1981).  All
independent and control variables are lagged by one year.  The logit model
estimates the coefficients for the exit option while setting the coefficients for the
non-exit option as zero.  Therefore, we must interpret the estimated coefficients as
the marginal effects of the covariates leading to the choice of exit option over the
non-exit model.
In Appendix I the first column reports the base model where Firm size kt-1,
Leverage ratio kt-1, Liquidity ratio kt-1, Return on assets kt-1, Diversification kt-1,
Advertising intensity kt-1, Capital intensity kt-1, and Market concentration kt-1 are
included as control variables.  Model Two introduces Product-market relatedness
kt-1 to investigate its effect on exit.  Model Three introduces the Environmental
relatedness kt-1 variable.  Model Four contains the interaction effects of Product-
market relatedness kt-1 and Environmental relatedness kt-1 .  In Model Five both
AvgProductMktRel kt-1 and AvgEnvironmentalRel kt-1 are entered simultaneously.  I
discuss the results based on the full model (Model Five) in Appendix I.  The log
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likelihood estimates indicating the fit of each model are given at the bottom of the
table.
In Hypothesis 5 I proposed that that product-market relatedness has a
negative relationship with exit.  Model Five in Appendix I provides a test of this
hypothesis and supports the proposition.  The estimated coefficient for the Product-
market relatedness kt-1 variable is negative and significant, supporting the
hypothesis that the farther the host and target industries are in terms of product-
market relatedness, the greater the likelihood that the firm will exit that industry.
Hypothesis 6 proposed a negative relationship between environmental
relatedness and exit, and this hypothesis is also supported in Model Five.  The
coefficient for Environmental relatedness kt-1 is negative and significant, thus
supporting the hypothesis that the farther the host and target industries are in terms
of environmental relatedness, the greater the likelihood that the firm will exit that
industry.
The tests for Hypothesis 7 are included in Model Five.  This hypothesis
predicted that firms were more likely to focus on product-market issues than
environmental issues, resulting in firms exiting businesses in the following order –
(1) product-market unrelated, environmental unrelated, (2) product-market
unrelated, environmental related, (3) product-market related, environmental
unrelated, (4) product-market related, environment related.  The following 2 x 2
table (Table 4) is included to help clarify the order of exit:
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Table 4: Order of Exit
Product-market
Related Unrelated
Related
Environment
        Unrelated
The standardized beta coefficients on these variables in Model Five in
Appendix I provide a test for the first part of this hypothesis.  The coefficient on
Product-market relatedness kt-1  is -.43 whereas the coefficient on Environmental
relatedness kt-1 is only -.11.  The larger beta coefficient on product-market
relatedness supports the idea that firms will be more influenced by product-market
relatedness than environmental relatedness in their exit decisions.  Therefore, firms
will exit businesses in Box 1 and 2 (Product-market unrelated) before they would
consider exiting businesses in Boxes 3 and 4 (Product-market related).  I also more
specifically proposed in Hypothesis 7 that product-market relatedness and
4 2
3 1
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environmental relatedness leverage each other, resulting in a combined negative
effect on exit.  However, the estimated positive and significant interaction between
Product-market relatedness kt-1  *  Environmental relatedness kt-1 does not provides
support for this hypothesis, and the expected order of businesses is not confirmed.
In Hypothesis 8a I predicted that average product-market relatedness has a
negative relationship with exit, and is supported in Model Five.  The coefficient for
AvgProductMktRel kt-1 is negative and significant, supporting the hypothesis that
the smaller the average distance in product-market relatedness between successive
entries into businesses, the lower the likelihood of exit.
Hypothesis 8b proposed a negative relationship between average
environmental relatedness and exit.  The estimated positive interaction between
average environmental relatedness and exit does not support this hypothesis.  Thus,
Hypothesis 8b - the smaller the average distance in environmental relatedness
between successive entries into businesses, the lower the likelihood of exit – fails
to be supported.
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5.3 Control Variables
A total of eight control variables were included in the logit regression
analyses on entry and exit.  At the firm level, I included control variables for the
firm’s size, financial resources and prior experiences in entry and exit.  At the
industry level, I included three industrial market structure variables indicating the
relative attractiveness of entry or exit.  Overall, only two control variables were
significant in the entry analysis (Firm size kt-1, and Market concentration kt-1) and
only one variable was significant in the exit analysis (Firm size kt-1).
In the entry analysis, the coefficients on the firm’s size, financial resources
and prior experiences are all positive, suggesting a positive relationship with the
likelihood of entry.  However, only the coefficient on the variable Firm size kt-1 is
significant.  This indicates that a firm’s slack, as well as other resources, increases
its likelihood of entry.  At the industry level, the coefficients on Advertising
intensity kt-1, Capital intensity kt-1, and Market concentration kt-1 are all negative, yet
only the coefficient on the variable Market concentration kt-1 is significant.  Market
concentration can signify high entry barriers and tough, incumbent competitors
thereby decreasing the likelihood of entry.  On the whole, firm size has a positive
effect on the likelihood of entry while market concentration has a negative effect on
entry.
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In the exit analysis, the coefficients on the firm’s size, financial resources
and prior experiences were all negative, with one exception of Return on assets kt-1
that had a positive sign, suggesting an overall negative relationship with the
likelihood of exit.  Moreover, out of the five firm level control variables, only firm
size was significant, indicating that slack and other resources seems to decrease the
likelihood of exit.  Two of the industry control variables, Advertising intensity kt-1
and Capital intensity kt-1 have positive coefficients, indicating a positive
relationship with the likelihood of exit.  However, the coefficients are not
significant.  The last industry level control variable, Market concentration kt-1, has
a negative coefficient but it is not significant.  Overall, the only one variable was
significant in the exit analysis, Firm size kt-1, and it indicated a negative relationship
with the likelihood of exit.
5.4 Summary of the Key Results
Appendix J has a summary of all of the hypotheses and the corresponding
results.  Overall, the results provide evidence that product-market relatedness and
environmental relatedness affect the entry and exit decisions of firms.  Two
hypotheses (H1 and H4) out of a total of four hypotheses presented on entry were
supported and significant.  Likewise, three hypotheses (H5, H6 and H8a) out of a
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total of five hypotheses presented on exit were supported and significant.  The key
results are summarized below.
I found that product-market relatedness has a positive effect on the
likelihood of entry (Hypothesis 1).  The unexpected result of the study, that
environmental relatedness has a negative effect on entry, instead of a positive
effect, deserves more attention (Hypothesis 2).  To summarize, this result is saying
that the farther the firm and its target are, in terms of environmental relatedness, the
more likely it is that the firm will enter that industry.  A possible explanation for
this interesting result is that firms have not yet recognized how to distinguish
between different environments.  Thus, they are unable recognize if a potential
target’s environment is similar to their existing one.
The data did not provide evidence that product-market relatedness and
environmental relatedness leverage each other in the likelihood of entry
(Hypothesis 3).  A possible explanation for this finding is that firms have not yet
recognized and/or do not feel that a unique synergy results from the two types of
relatedness.  I do find confirmation that firms focus more on product-market
relatedness than environmental relatedness (Hypothesis 4).  The confirmation of
Hypothesis 4 may also help to explain my non-finding in Hypothesis 2 and 3 –
firms are so focused on product-market relatedness that they have yet to consider,
discover or develop: (1) environmental relatedness, by itself, or (2) the synergy
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between product-market relatedness and any other kind of relatedness, including
environmental relatedness, with respect to entry.
Turning now to the scope decision of exit, the results of the study also
provide support for the hypothesis that product-market relatedness has a negative
effect on exit (Hypothesis 5).  In addition, I found that environmental relatedness
has a negative effect on the likelihood on exit (Hypothesis 6).  In Hypothesis 7 I
proposed that product-market relatedness will have a stronger influence on the
direction of exit than environmental relatedness and that firms will exit businesses
in an order that reflects this assertion.  The data provide a mixed message on this
proposition.  The larger beta coefficient on product-market relatedness supports the
idea that firms will be more influenced by product-market relatedness than
environmental relatedness in their exit decisions.  However, the order of exit is not
confirmed with the interaction.
I also found that the smaller the average distance in product-market
relatedness between successive entries into businesses, the lower the likelihood of
exit (Hypothesis H8a).  The data reported that accompanying hypothesis - that the
smaller the average distance in environmental relatedness between successive
entries into businesses, the lower the likelihood of exit – was not supported
(Hypothesis 8b).
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6 Conclusion
In this chapter I discuss the key contributions of this dissertation.  The
chapter is divided into three sections.  First, I discuss the dissertation’s
contributions to theory and research.  The second section describes the
contributions to practice.  Last, I present some directions for future research and
conclude the dissertation.
6.1 Contributions to Theory and Research
Research has either pursued the exploration of firm’s entry choices to the
exclusion of its exit choices, or vice versa.  Research examining the combination of
the two concurrently (both entry and exit), has been almost completely ignored by
the literature.  A simple search on diversification and divestments immediately
dwarfs the amount of research completed on corporate evolution.  Corporate
evolution, just as its name implies, requires an examination over time.  It is only
through knowing where the firm is currently at and understanding where it has been
before that we can predict were the firm will be in the future.
My examination of learning and corporate evolution draws on a concept
heavily used from the diversification literature – the concept of relatedness.
Relatedness naturally lends itself to the learning literature, for if something is
98
related it is familiar to a prior experience and it is the compilation of experiences
that serve as the building blocks to learning.
It is through product-market relatedness and environmental relatedness that
I am trying to tap into the constructs of product-market learning and environmental
learning.  I suggest that product-market learning is the accumulation of the concrete
“know what” and hard facts derived from a firm’s experiences in a given set of
product-markets.  This idea of acquiring the substantive knowledge of a business
can be extended beyond product-markets (where I focus), and can include the
“content” learning gained from a firm’s experiences in terms of technologies,
distribution channels, scientific research and production processes.  Environmental
learning is defined as the firm’s accumulation of the elusive “know how”
knowledge gained from its experiences managing businesses in different decision-
making environments.  Environmental learning taps into the notion of the dominant
logic, defined as a way of thinking or managing in a given business (Prahalad &
Bettis, 1986).
My selection of examining product-market relatedness and environmental
relatedness on corporate evolution was intended to draw in theoretical perspectives
usually not paired together.  Product-market relatedness and “content” learning
draws heavily on the resource-based view perspective.  In contrast, environmental
relatedness or “context” learning draws primarily on evolutionary economics, path
dependence and the strategic decision-making perspectives.  This distinction
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mirrors the strategy field more generally, where “content” issues are analyzed
separately from “process” issues (I maintain that “context” issues are subsumed in
the process strategy research stream).  I argue that by applying the lens of two
research streams together, and their accompanying theories, clearly enhances our
understanding of an understudied phenomenon.  I also believe that this triggers a
constructive dialog on the value of opening up the notion of relatedness to include
both “content” and “process” dimensions.
This dissertation directly responds to the call that “more effort has gone into
identifying knowledge as the basis of competitive advantage than into explaining
how organizations can develop, retain and transfer (their) knowledge” (Argote &
Ingram, 2000, p.156).  By examining a firm’s experiences over time, it is possible
to trace how the firm develops, retains and transfers its knowledge across its
choices.  I argue that it is this internal insight that creates value for the firm.  In
examining the corporate evolution of firms, we find new understanding into the
processes behind one of the most fundamental questions in strategy: how value is
created.
Another contribution derived from this dissertation pulls from the resource-
based view.  The knowledge building capability is a resource that firms seek to
attain.  I argue that a firm’s distinctive knowledge building capabilities will indicate
certain directions for growth as well as decline.  Thus, if a firm’s actions follow the
suggestions of its knowledge building resource, our analysis of corporate evolution
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using the resource-based view can help us to answer a fundamental question is
strategy; how does a firm develop a unique resource that serves as a sustainable
advantage (Porter, 1980; Barney, 1986).
In sum, this dissertation is the exploration and development of corporate
evolution by integrating the resource-based view, organizational learning,
evolutionary economics, path dependence and strategic decision-making
perspectives.  Rarely have these perspectives been applied simultaneously, and
through their application we gain a unique and comprehensive understanding of the
understudied phenomenon of corporate evolution.
6.2 Contributions to Practice
This dissertation contributes to managers obtaining a better understanding
of how their firms can conduct their strategic choices more appropriately - in order
to maximize their firm’s learning experience and knowledge accumulation.  Top
management teams can evaluate their firm’s learning capabilities more thoroughly
and select their firm’s next strategic choices accordingly.  This strategy will allow
the firm to leverage its prior knowledge and learning and thus, increase its
performance in its strategic choices both now and in the future.
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6.3 Directions for Future work and Conclusion
In this dissertation, I examine the relationship between organizational
learning and corporate evolution.  More specifically, I analyze the type of scope
experience acquired by the firm and how this affects its future scope choices.  A
natural direction for future research that comes from this dissertation is to follow up
with a different dependent variable and evaluate the impact of a firm’s scope
experiences (type) on the firm’s performance.
Additionally, another direction for future research is to build on my analysis
of the type of scope experience acquired by the firm with two more dimensions of a
firm’s scope experiences; sequencing and pacing, and see if these dimensions have
different effects of the firm’s future scope selections and performance.  For
example, I claim that a firm’s scope sequencing, i.e. the order of the firm’s scope
experiences, provides the benefit of skill building, affects the performance of the
firm’s future scope experiences.  A firm’s scope pacing, i.e. the time in between the
firm’s scope actions, is hypothesized to provide the benefits of absorption,
fermenting, and renewal, affecting the performance of the firm’s future scope
choices.
I believe that over time, pursuing these research directions, the
comprehensive findings will provide evidence that (1) what a firm learns (type), (2)
what order the firm learns it (sequencing), and (3) the speed the firm learns it at
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(pacing), does indeed affect the organization’s future scope choices and the
performance of those choices.
A third and purely theoretical direction for future research would be to
develop an understanding of learning within the framework of “content” and
“process” learning, derived from the notion of “content” and “process” research
within the strategy field.  This could bridge together theories not typically applied
together and potentially uncover many rich insights.  One avenue that comes to
mind in helping to shape this future direction is the concepts of declarative and
procedural memory from the psychology field.
In sum, I examine corporate evolution, i.e. how a firm changes its scope
through diversification into new businesses and exits from existing ones and what it
learns in the process.  I find that product-market relatedness and environmental
relatedness do impact a firm’s scope decisions.  I show that firms focus heavily on
product-market relatedness, and potentially to the detriment of their fully
understanding environmental relatedness.  Thus, by firms not completely
comprehending their environmental experiences, I provide one explanation for an
unanswered riddle in the strategy literature: why does related diversification fail?
103
Appendix A:
Variables Of The Study And The Proposed Effects
Proposed sign Hypothesis
ENTRY (DV)
Product-market relatedness + H1
Environmental relatedness + H2
Product-market relatedness
* environmental relatedness
+ H3
Product-market relatedness
will have a stronger
influence on the direction of
a firm’s entry choices than
environmental relatedness
Larger beta on product-market
relatedness coefficient
H4
EXIT (DV)
Product-market relatedness _ H5
Environmental relatedness _ H6
Product-market
unrelatedness will have a
stronger influence on the
direction of exit than
environmental unrelatedness
Product-market relatedness
*environmental relatedness
Larger beta on product-market
relatedness coefficient
_
H7
Average product-market
distance between entries
_ H8a
Average environmental
distance between entries
_ H8b
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Appendix B:
4-Digit SIC Classification Codes for Manufacturing
483 4-Digit SIC’s between 2011 – 3999
(this list only provides a sample of 3 pages as representation of the entire pool)
4-Digit SIC Description
2011 Fresh And Frozen Meat From Animals Slaughtered In This Plant
2013 Sausage And Other Prepared Meats, Not Made In Meat Packing Plants
2015 Poultry And Egg Processing
2021 Creamery Butter
2022 Cheese, Natural And Processed
2023 Dry, Condensed, And Evaporated Milk Products
2024 Ice Cream And Frozen Desserts
2026 Fluid Milk
2032 Canned Specialties
2033 Canned Fruits And Vegetables
2034 Dried And Dehydrated Fruits, Vegetables, And Soups
2035 Pickles, Sauces, And Salad Dressings
2037 Frozen Fruits And Vegetables
2038 Frozen Specialties, N.E.C.
2041 Flour And Other Grain Mill Products
2043 Cereal Breakfast Foods
2044 Rice Milling
2045 Prepared Flour Mixes And Doughs
2046 Wet Corn Milling
2047 Dog And Cat Food
2048 Prepared Feeds, N.E.C.
2051 Bread, Cake, And Related Products
2052 Cookies And Crackers
2053 Frozen Bakery Products
2061 Raw Cane Sugar
2062 Cane Sugar Refining
2063 Beet Sugar
2064 Candy And Other Confectionery Products
2066 Chocolate And Cocoa Products
2067 Chewing Gum
2068 Nuts And Seeds
2074 Cottonseed Oil Mills
2075 Soybean Oil Mills
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2076 Vegetable Oil Mills, N.E.C.
2077 Animal And Marine Fats And Oils
2079 Edible Fats And Oils, N.E.C.
2082 Malt Beverages
2083 Malt
2084 Wines, Brandy, And Brandy Spirits
2085 Distilled And Blended Liquors
2086 Bottled And Canned Soft Drinks
2087 Flavoring Extracts And Syrups, N.E.C.
2091 Canned And Cured Fish And Other Seafoods
2092 Fresh Or Frozen Prepared Fish And Other Seafood
2095 Roasted Coffee
2096 Potato Chips And Similar Products
2098 Macaroni And Spaghetti
2099 Food Preparations, N.E.C.
2111 Cigarettes, Including Nontobacco Cigarettes
2121 Cigars
2131 Chewing And Smoking Tobacco
2141 Tobacco Stemming And Redrying
2211 Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Cotton
2221 Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Manmade Fiber And Silk
2241 Narrow Fabric Mills
2251 Women'S Hosiery, Except Socks
2252 Hosiery, N.E.C.
2253 Knit Outerwear Mills
2254 Knit Underwear Mills
2257 Weft Knit Fabric Mills
2261 Finishing Plants, Cotton
2262 Finishing Plants, Manmade Fiber And Silk
2269 Finishing Plants, N.E.C.
2273 Carpets And Rugs
2281 Yarn Spinning Mills
2282 Yarn Throwing And Winding Mills
2284 Thread Mills
2295 Coated Fabrics, Not Rubberized
2296 Tire Cord And Tire Cord Fabrics
2297 Nonwoven Fabrics
2298 Cordage And Twine
2299 Textile Goods, N.E.C.
2311 Men'S And Boys' Suits And Coats
2321 Men'S And Boys' Shirts
2322 Men'S And Boys' Underwear And Nightwear
2325 Men'S And Boys' Trousers And Slacks
2326 Men'S And Boys' Work Clothing
2329 Men'S And Boys' Clothing, N.E.C.
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2331 Women'S, Misses', And Juniors' Shirts And Blouses
2335 Women'S, Misses', And Juniors' Dresses
2337 Women'S, Misses', And Juniors' Suits, Skirts, And Coats
2339 Women'S, Misses', And Juniors' Outerwear, N.E.C.
2342 Brassieres, Girdles, And Allied Garments
2353 Hats, Caps, And Millinery
2361 Girls', Children'S, And Infants' Dresses, Blouses, And Shirts
2369 Girls', Children'S, And Infants' Other Outerwear, N.E.C.
2381 Dress And Work Gloves And Mittens
2385 Waterproof Outerwear
2386 Leather And Sheep-lined Clothing
2389 Apparel And Accessories, N.E.C.
2391 Curtains And Draperies
2392 Housefurnishings, N.E.C.
2393 Textile Bags
2394 Canvas And Related Products
2395 Pleating And Stitching
2396 Automotive Trimmings, Apparel Findings, And Related Products
2399 Fabricated Textile Products, N.E.C.
2411 Logging
2421 Sawmills And Planing Mills, General
2426 Hardwood Dimension And Flooring Mills
2429 Special Product Sawmills, N.E.C.
2431 Millwork
2434 Wood Kitchen Cabinets
2435 Hardwood Veneer And Plywood
2436 Softwood Veneer And Plywood
2439 Structural Wood Members, N.E.C.
2441 Nailed Wood Boxes And Shook
2449 Wood Containers, N.E.C.
2451 Mobile Homes
2452 Prefabricated Wood Buildings
2491 Wood Preserving
2493 Reconstituted Wood Products
2499 Wood Products, N.E.C.
2511 Wood Household Furniture
2512 Upholstered Household Furniture
2514 Metal Household Furniture
2515 Mattresses, Foundations, And Convertible Beds
2517 Wood Television And Radio Cabinets
2519 Household Furniture, N.E.C.
2521 Wood Office Furniture
2522 Office Furniture, Except Wood
2531 Public Building And Related Furniture
2541 Wood Partitions And Fixtures
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Appendix C:
List of Environmental Variables, Definitions, Descriptions and Data Sources
Variables of
interest
Definition Description Data Source
V1.  Growth
in total sales
Value of shipments;
regression slope
coefficient (B), divided
by mean value (Y);
1981 –1989.
Calculate regression slope
of total sales growth on time
using all prior years (e.g.,
77-80 for year 81) with time
(years) coded as sequential
integers starting with zero.
Calculate mean for growth
in total sales using all prior
years (e.g., 77-80 for year
81).
U.S. Bureau of the
Census,
Census of Manufactures
V2.  Growth
in price-cost
margin
Value added by
manufacture minus
total wages; same
measurement
procedure as V1.
Same as V1 except wages
are subtracted from value
before.
Same as V1.
V3.  Growth
in total
employment
Total employment;
same measurement
procedure as V1.
Same as V1 except for
different outcome.
Same as V1.
V4.  Growth
in value added
by
manufacture
Value added by
manufacture; same
measurement
procedure as V1.
Same as V1 except for
different outcome.
Same as V1.
V5.  Growth
in the number
of
manufacturing
establishments
Number of
manufacturing
establishments,
average annual
percentage change.
Calculate the percentage
growth by calculating the
difference between the
current year and the
previous year and divide the
difference by the previous
year value.
Same as V1.
V6.  Sales
Concentration
Percentage of total
value of shipments by
the largest 8
companies.
This variable was converted
into integer format by
dividing by 100 to created a
percentage bounded by zero
and 1; Blau method.
Same as V1.
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Variables of
interest
Definition Description Data Source
V7.
Concentration
of inputs
Measure of the
heterogeneity of a
given industry’s input
environment - reflects
the extent to which a
large portion of an
industry’s input was
supplied by relatively
few industries (an
index that increases
with the number of
different input
industries and the
evenness of the
distribution of inputs
among these
industries).
Calculated total
intermediate inputs for each
IO industry code (excludes
value added entries). For
each IO industry code,
divide row UseTableCell by
the total for the IO industry
code and square. Then, sum
the squared percentages.
Finally, map the IO codes
back to the SIC 4-digit
codes.  Herfindahl index.
U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis,
Input-Output Structure
of the U.S. Economy
V8.  Diversity
of products
Measures the degree to
which the output of a
four-digit industry was
concentrated within a
few, seven-digit SIC
products or was spread
evenly among many.
For each 7-digit SIC value,
create SIC 4-digit variable
from 1st 4 digits and 3-digit
from last 3 digits.
Calculated total sales across
4-digit and sub-totals for
each 3-digit code within
each sic 4-digit code. For
each 3-digit code, divide the
3-digit sub-total by the total
for the 4-digit SIC code and
square. Then, sum the
squared percentages across
all 3-digit codes within each
4-digit code.  Blau method.
Same as V1.
V9.
Specialization
ratio
Ratio of primary
product shipments to
total (primary and
secondary, excluding
miscellaneous) product
shipments for the
establishments
classified in the
industry.
This variable was converted
into integer format by
dividing by 100 to created a
percentage bounded by zero
and 1.
Same as V1.
109
Variables of
interest
Definition Description Data Source
V10.
Concentration
of outputs
Measure of the
heterogeneity of a
given industry’s output
task environment –
reflects the extend to
which a large portion
of a industry’s output
was purchased by
relatively few
industries.
Same as V7 except the total
value added is summed with
the total intermediate
products to create the
denominator.  Herfindahl
index.
Same as V7.
V11.
Instability in
total sales
Value of shipments;
standard error of the
regression coefficient
(S) divided by mean
value
(Y); 1981-1989.
Calculate standard error of
regression slope of total
sales growth on time using
all prior years (e.g., 77-80
for year 81) with time
(years) coded as sequential
integers starting with zero.
Calculate mean for growth
in total sales using all prior
years (e.g., 77-80 for year
81).
Same as V1.
V12.
Instability in
price-cost
margin
Value added by
manufacture minus
total wages; same
measurement
procedure as V11.
Same as V11 except for
different outcome.
Same as V1.
V13.
Instability in
total
employment
Total employment;
same measurement
procedure as V11.
Same as V11 except for
different outcome.
Same as V1.
V14.
Instability in
value added
by
manufacture
Value added by
manufacture; same
measurement
procedure as V11.
Same as V11 except for
different outcome.
Same as V1.
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Variables of
interest
Definition Description Data Source
V15.
Geographical
concentration
of total sales
Measure of the
geographical
concentration of total
sales.
Created variable with 10
unique values representing
different regions. Calculated
total sales across regions
and sub-totals for each
region for each sic 4-digit
code. For each region,
divide the region sub-total
by the total for the 4-digit
SIC code and square. Then,
sum the squared percentages
across all regions with
percentages to arrive at a
total sum.  Blau method.
Same as V1.
V16.
Geographical
concentration
of value added
by
manufacture
Measure of the
geographical
concentration of value
added by manufacture.
Same as V15 except for
different outcome.
Same as V1.
V17.
Geographical
concentration
of total
employment
Measure of the
geographical
concentration of total
employment.
Same as V15 except for
different outcome.
Same as V1.
V18.
Geographical
concentration
of industry
establishments
 Measure of the
geographical
concentration of
industry
establishments.
Same as V15 except for
different outcome.
Same as V1.
V19.  Impact
of all other
industries on
output of
given industry
The sum of all
requirements, both
direct and indirect,
placed on a given
industry if every
industry increased its
output by one unit.
Multiply the total
requirements coefficient for
each industry with
c_UseTableCell and sum
across all rows within an IO
Industry code. Map IO code
back to SIC 4-digit codes.
Same as V7.
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Variables of
interest
Definition Description Data Source
V20.  Relative
power of
indirectly
linked factors
on output
The sum of just the
indirect requirements
placed on an industry if
every industry
increased its output by
one unit.
Multiply the Total
requirements coefficient for
each industry with
c_UseTableCell row values
and then substract from it
the product of the
c_UseTableCell row values
multiplied by the  Direct
requirements coefficient.
Divide this difference by the
product of the
c_UseTableCell row values
multiplied by the Direct
requirements coefficient.
Sum across all rows within
an Industry code.  Map IO
code back to SIC 4-digit
codes.
Same as V7.
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Appendix D:
Principal Components Analysis On Twenty Environmental Variables With A
Three Factor Solution
Variable Complexity Munificence Dynamism Factor4 Factor5
v15geoshipmts .93
v16geovaladd .93
v17geoemploye .89
v18geoestab .78 .21
v6_salesconcen .56
v8shipvalrev -.41 -.40 .37
v4_ValueAddedGrowth .94 -.22
v1_TotalSalesGrowth .94
v2_PriceCostGrowth .91 -.22
v3_TotalEmployGrowth .88
v5_NumEstabGrowth .48
v14_ValueAddedInstab .93
v11_TotalSalesInstab .92
v12_PriceCostInstab .22 .89
v13_TotalEmployInstab .80
v10sum_OutputConPer .20 .91
v7sum_InputConPer .91
v20sum_RelativeImpact .79
v9_SpecialRatio -.23 .29 -.38
v19sum_AllOtherImpact    -.33 -.61
Total Variance Explained 3.85 3.75 3.38 2.12 1.34
Percent Variance 19% 19% 17% 11% 7%
STATUS Keep Keep Keep Drop Drop
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Appendix E:
Overview of Entry and Exit Activity of 106 Sample Firms
in Manufacturing During 1981-89
1981-83 1983-85 1985-87 1987-89 Total Per
firm
average
per
year
Per firm
average
throughout
time period
of study
Size6
ENTRY 209 343 664 514 1730 4.93 19.72 24%
EXIT 221 436 483 237 1377 4.18 16.72 29%
                                                 
6 Size indicates the average proportion of sales of entered or exited businesses to the total sales
figure (from 1981-1989) of a company.
114
Appendix F:
List of Variables, Definitions, Descriptions and Data Sources
Variables of interest Definition Description Data Source
Dependent variables
1.  Entrykj Entry is measured as a 0 or
1 variable, depending on
whether or not firm k
entered a given 4-digit SIC
industry j after 1981.
The entry variable is coded 1
for all SIC 4-digit codes that a
firm enters and 0 if the firm
does not enter that 4-digit SIC
code.  If the firm is already in
4-digit SIC value, it is coded
as a 9 and then selected out.
Only manufacturing SIC 4-
digit codes are used.
 Trinet data
2.  Exitkj Exit is measured as a 0 or
1 variable, depending on
whether or not firm k
exited a given 4-digit SIC
industry after 1981.
The exit variable is coded 1
for all SIC 4-digit codes that a
firm exits and 0 if the firm
does not exit that 4-digit SIC
code. If the firm has already
exited a 4-digit SIC value in a
prior year, subsequent years
are deleted. If the firm never
uses a 4-digit SIC code, all
years related to that 4-digit
SIC code  are dropped. Only
manufacturing SIC 4-digit
codes are used.
Trinet data
Independent variables
3.  Product-market
relatedness kt-1
Sales-weighted concentric
diversification index;
reflects the product market
relatedness between the
scope choice and all other
industries in which firm k
has operations in year t.
This is a relatedness measure
based on every 4-digit SIC
firm k competes in compared
to its target business.  The
percentage of firm k’s sales in
each 4-digit SIC are weighted
by a value that depends upon
the distance between the target
industry and all the other
industries in which firm k has
operations.  Values were
weighted by 2 if the
businesses were within the
same three-digit SIC code, 1 if
the businesses were within the
same 2-digit SIC code and 0 if
the businesses are in different
2-digit industries.
Trinet data
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Variables of interest Definition Description Data Source
4.  Environmental
relatedness kt-1
Reflects the environmental
relatedness between the
scope choice and all other
industries in which firm k
has operations in year t;
this variable reflects three
different dimensions of the
environment: munificence,
complexity and dynamism.
Blau method.
This is a relatedness measure
based on a PCA of 20
environmental variables,
where three factors emerged -
munificence, complexity and
dynamism.   14 variables
loaded on these factors.
Munificence is a composite
variable of V1, V2, V3, V4
and V5.  Complexity is a
composite variable of V16,
V17, V18, V19 and V6.
Dynamism is a composite
variable of V11, V12, V13
and V15.  Based on every 4-
digit SIC firm k competes in,
create a sales weighted sum
reflecting the firm’s average
level of munificence,
complexity and dynamism.
Compare the firm k’s
environmental score to the
target’s environmental score.
Trinet data
U.S. Bureau of the Census
Census of Manufactures
5.  Interaction term between
Product-market relatedness
and Environmental
relatedness kt-1
Reflects the extent to
which there is a synergy or
an added explanatory
value benefit coming from
product-market relatedness
and environmental
relatedness together that is
greater than the individual
effects of these variables.
Create multiplicative
interaction term between
Product-market relatedness
and Environmental relatedness
by multiplying the two values
together.
Trinet data
U.S. Bureau of the Census
Census of Manufactures
6.  Average Product-market
distance between entries kt-1
An average measure used
to reflect the average
product-market relatedness
between entries.
This measure is computed by:
(1) taking the target’s product-
market relatedness score, and
(2) summing it with all the
other target entries’ product-
market relatedness score
before it (up to that period),
and (3) then dividing that total
by the number of entries.
Trinet data
7.  Average Environmental
distance between entries kt-1
An average measure used
to reflect the average
environmental relatedness
between entries.    
This measure is computed by:
(1) taking the target’s
environmental relatedness
score, and (2) summing it with
all the other target entries’
environmental relatedness
score before it (up to that
period), and (3) then dividing
that total by the number of
entries.
Trinet data
U.S. Bureau of the Census
Census of Manufactures
Control Variables
(firm-level)
8.  Firm size kt-1 Logarithm of total assets
of firm i in year  t-1.
Calculate variable using
Compustat data.
Compustat data
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9.  Leverage ratio kt-1 Book value of long-term
debt to market value of
equity of firm i in year  t-
1.
Calculate variable using
Compustat data.
Compustat data
10.  Liquidity ratio kt-1 Current assets divided by
current liabilities of firm i
in year t-1.
Calculate variable using
Compustat data.
Compustat data
11.  Return on assets kt-1 Net income divided by
total assets of firm i in
year  t-1.
Calculate variable using
Compustat data.
Compustat data
12.  Diversification kt-1 Entropy measure –
controls for the extent of
the firm’s diversification.
Berry-Herfindahl index of the
firm’s diversification.
Trinet data
(industry-level)
13.  Advertising intensity kt-1 Advertising expenses
divided by sales.
Calculate variable based using
Compustat data.
Compustat data
14.  Capital intensity kt-1 Capital expenditures
divided by sales.
Calculate variable based using
Compustat data.
Compustat data
15.  Market concentration kt-
1
Eight firm concentration
ratio.
Using original value as
covariate.
U.S. Bureau of the Census
Census of Manufactures
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Appendix G:
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Mean StdDev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Product-market relatedness .33 .40
2 Environmental relatedness .79 .12 .24
<.0001
3 AvgProductMktRel .27 .30 .68 .18
<.0001 <.0001
4 AvgEnvironmentalRel .78 .10 .16 .51 .24
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001
5 Firm size 8.68 .95 -.16 -.15 -.16 -.19
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
6 Leverage ratio .59 1.96 -.03 -.07 -.03 -.09 .10
.01 <.0001 .01 <.0001 <.0001
7 Liquidity ratio 1.63 .60 .07 .16 .07 .19 -.42 -.06
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
8 Return on assets .06 .05 .07 .11 .10 .09 .00 -.14 .20
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 .97 <.0001 <.0001
9 Product diversification .19 .13 .21 -.04 .19 -.11 .10 .02 -.13 .02
<.0001 .00 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 .14 <.0001 .06
10 Advertising intensity .04 .04 .14 .02 .10 .02 -.34 .05 -.05 .10 .18
<.0001 .09 <.0001 .03 <.0001 .00 .00 <.0001 <.0001
11 Capital intensity .06 .03 .00 -.05 .00 -.03 .33 -.06 -.28 .02 .24 -.26
.76 .00 .68 .02 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 .08 <.0001 <.0001
12 Market concentration .49 .22 .23 .31 .16 .10 .06 -.01 -.01 .03 .04 -.01 .03
    <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 .63 .41 .01 .00 .34 .01  
Note:  Only correlations greater than .32 (representing 10%) of variance are interpreted since the large sample size makes most correlations statistically significant
Note: N = 7522
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Appendix H:
GEE Logit Regression Predicting Likelihood of Entry
120
Variable M1Estimate M1ProbZ M2Estimate M2ProbZ M3Estimate M3ProbZ M4Estimate M4ProbZ
Intercept -3.26 .000 -3.00 .001 -2.62 .004 -2.61 .004
Firm size .25 .001 .25 .002 .26 .002 .26 .002
Leverage ratio .02 .196 .01 .407 .01 .610 .01 .615
Liquidity ratio .21 .020 .10 .366 .10 .363 .10 .368
Return on assets .33 .731 .25 .803 .28 .782 .28 .779
Product diversification 1.02 .028 .75 .128 .75 .132 .75 .131
Advertising intensity -1.04 .305 -1.26 .220 -1.17 .250 -1.17 .250
Capital intensity -1.27 .471 -1.47 .413 -1.72 .348 -1.72 .347
Market concentration -.29 .056 -.72 .000 -.62 .000 -.62 .000
Product-market
relatedness 3.50 .000 .87 .000 .87 .000
Environmental
relatedness .11 .001 -.11 .003
PMR*ENVR       -.26 .887
Deviance 4902.41 4472.87 4465.91 4465.88
Difference in Log
Likelihoods -214.77 -3.48 -.01
Log Likelihood -2451.20 -2236.44 -2232.95 -2232.94
DF Comparing
previous model) 1 1 1
Chi-Square 429.53 6.97 .03
p-value .000 .008 .869
121
Appendix I:
GEE Logit Regression Predicting Likelihood of Exit
Variable
M1
Estimate
M1
ProbZ
M2
Estimate
M2
ProbZ
M3
Estimate
M3
ProbZ
M4
Estimate
M4
ProbZ
M5
Estimate
M5
ProbZ
Intercept .26 .744 1.61 .032 1.16 .118 1.21 .097 1.40 .146
Firm Size -.03 .636 -.12 .060 -.13 .027 -.15 .009 -.17 .008
Leverage ratio -.01 .627 -.01 .570 -.02 .464 -.02 .393 -.02 .386
Liquidity ratio -.05 .533 -.03 .638 -.02 .830 -.02 .821 -.03 .695
Return on assets .03 .970 .44 .583 .65 .433 .64 .449 .83 .336
Product diversification .40 .279 -.22 .497 -.14 .666 -.09 .769 -.20 .550
Avertising intensity .76 .630 1.42 .334 1.36 .373 1.37 .366 1.06 .483
Capital intensity .17 .928 .22 .904 .40 .826 .65 .724 .46 .805
Market concentration -.86 .000 -.41 .033 -.27 .183 -.20 .327 -.20 .333
Product-market relatedness -1.30 .000 -.47 .000 -.53 .000 -.43 .000
Environmental relatedness -.12 .009 -.09 .031 -.11 .045
PMR*ENVR 3.92 .001 3.94 .001
AvgProductMktRel -.65 .031
AvgEnvironmentalRel         .27 .647
Deviance 4050.03 3916.65 3909.61 3894.71 3886.10
Difference in Log Likelihoods -66.69 -3.52 -7.45 -4.31
Log Likelihood -2025.01 -1958.33 -1954.81 -1947.36 -1943.05
DF Comparing previous model) 1 1 1 2
Chi-Square 133.38 7.04 14.90 8.62
p-value .000 .008 .000 .013
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Appendix J:
Proposed Effects and the Findings
ENTRY (DV) Proposed sign Findings
H1  Product-market relatedness
+ +, significant
H2  Environmental relatedness
+ -, significant
H3  Product-market relatedness *
environmental relatedness + -, not
significant
H4  Product-market relatedness
will have a stronger influence on
the direction of a firm’s entry
choices than environmental
relatedness
Larger beta on product-
market relatedness
coefficient
supported
EXIT (DV)
H5  Product-market relatedness
- -, significant
H6  Environmental relatedness
- -, significant
H7  Product-market unrelatedness
will have a stronger influence on
the direction of exit than
environmental unrelatedness
Product-market relatedness *
environmental relatedness
Larger beta on product-
market
relatedness coefficient
-
supported
+, significant
H8a  Average product-market
distance between entries - -, significant
H8b  Average environmental
distance between entries - +, not
significant
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